Anger as a dissociative phenomenon: a contribution to an integrated theory of personality. by Chilenski, Gregory Michael
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1983
Anger as a dissociative phenomenon: a
contribution to an integrated theory of personality.
Gregory Michael Chilenski
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chilenski, Gregory Michael, "Anger as a dissociative phenomenon: a contribution to an integrated theory of personality." (1983).
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1708.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1708

ANGER AS A DISSOCIATIVE PHENOMENON:
A CONTRIBUTION TO AN INTEGRATED THEORY
OF PERSONALITY
A Dissertation Presented
By
GREGORY MICHAEL CHILENSKI
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 1983
Department of Psychology
ANGER AS A DISSOCIATIVE PHENOMENON:
A CONTRIBUTION TO AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF PERSONALITY
A Dissertation Presented
By
GREGORY MICHAEL CHI LENSKI
Approved as to style and content by:
A
Seymour Ep/tein, Chairperson of Committee
^^^^^^^^
William Matthews, Member
phem Reisman, Member
d, Member
Jam^rs M. Royer, Acting (fhairperson
irtment of Psychol i
DEDICATION
To Gail, without whom I can do nothing of lasting value.
i i i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish gratefully to thank:
Sy Epstein for his energetic and brilliant assistance at every
step of the way and for knowing I could do better at each step be-
fore I mysel f knew i t
.
Dave Todd for guiding me into and through the entire clinical
training program.
Steve Reisman for his unfailing support through numerous per-
mutations of my professional and personal life.
Bill Matthews for opening several new windows on self change.
iv
PREFACE
The concept of dissociation
, in recent years, has received in-
creased use by psychologists and by mental health practioners after
a long period of neglect. Hilgard (1977) reported numerous experimen-
tal studies in which subjects were able through hypnosis to reproduce
the hysterical symptoms first reported by pre-Freudian clinical inves-
tigators such as Janet. Hilgard argues that dissociation is a natural-
ly occurring phenomenon of consciousness. He states that his "neo-
dissociation theory" explains the phenomena both of co-consciousness
and of partial dissociation which his research has uncovered. Bower
(1981) has recently offered an "associative network theory" of the re-
lation between emotions and cognitions. This theory relies on the
dissociation of emotions as separate memory units. According to this
theory these "emotion nodes" collect together many other aspects of
the emotion and connect to them in memory by what are called "asso-
ciative pointers." These associated networks are organized as rela-
tively discrete cognitive and behavioral sub-systems in the person's
overall conceptual system.
In the clinical domain there is increased interest in the dis-
sociative anxiety disorders of psychogenic amnesia and fugue, multiple
personality, and depersonalization. This interest is reflected in the
v>
recently revised Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American
Psychiatric Association (1980). This manual offers separate diag-
nostic criteria for these three clinical phenomena which previously
had been lumped together with other phenomena under the heading of
hysterical neuroses. The dissociative processes characteristic of
traumatic stress disorders also have been re-discovered (Horowitz,
1976; Chilenski, 1982).
There are several trends in psychiatry and in clinical psychology
that contribute to a new legitimizing both of dissociative phenomena
as subjects for study and of dissociation as an explanatory concept.
Hypnosis, after a long absence from "respectable" clinical practice
and journals, is once again receiving increased attention. Cognitive-
ly oriented models of disturbance and treatment (eg. Ellis, 1973;
Beck, 1 976) have partly replaced older models based on the notion of
a dynamic unconscious (Bieber, 1980). The same partial replacement
is occurring with stress models of disturbance (Selye, 1976) and
stress-innoculation models of treatment and prevention (Miechenbaum,
1977). Finally, an historical analysis of Freud's early cases has
identified the subsequently neglected dissociative phenomena in those
reports (El 1 enberger
,
1970, 1 972). This historical analysis may have
contributed to a renewed interest in the works of Janet, Prince,
and other early dissociation theorists (McKellar, 1979).
Research on sleep and other altered states of consciousness also
suggests that the traditional Freudian model of the mind, i_e. con-
scious awareness and a dynamic unconscious separated by the way-station
of a preconscious, needs revision. This revision should account for
what appear to be multiple controls on consciousness, on emotion, and
on behavior. Not all of these multiple controls are in conscious
awareness nor are they of the kind thought to originate in the dynamic
unconscious. The concept of dissociation serves to advance this the-
oretical effort.
It must be kept in mind, however, that there is no single dis-
sociation theory. In fact, as is often the case in psychology, there
is no general agreement about what phenomena are best explained by
any dissociation theory. In this paper, dissociation as a general
theoretical term denotes the relation to conscious awareness of the
individual's controls on cognitive, emotional, and behavioral respond-
ing. These controls are not in the person's ordinary awareness but
are potentially accessible to ordinary consciousness. This general
meaning will be specified further in Chapter I when it is discussed in
the context of cognitive self-theory.
This entire investigation, both theoretically and methodological-
ly, is grounded on Epstein's cognitive self-theory (1973; 1980b), and
the research that theory has generated on the central significance of
the emotions in personality (Epstein, 1979b; 1982). It is argued that
the concept of dissociation is helpful to cognitive self-theory in
accounting for the organizing role of the emotions in the self-theory.
Emotions are seen as centrally significant organizers of coqnition,
of physical activation and arousal, and of behavior within the person's
vi 1
integrated theory of self. But emotions function as discrete para-
digms about the self's interaction with the world. As separate para-
digms, emotions are dissociated from each other within an overall
hierarchically organized, integrated self-theory. In short, viewed
from the perspective of cognitive self-theory, the emotions are
structurally dissociated. Evidence is presented here which shows
at least one emotion, anger, is indeed so organized. Phenomenolo-
gical evidence is presented for the existence of dissociative anger.
Anger was chosen to illustrate the theoretical argument for
several reasons. First, anger is usually considered one of the pri-
mary emotions. Second, anger is an emotion which figures prominant-
ly in theory about psychological disturbance; but there is relatively
little known about it from a therapeutic point of view (Frost, 1981;
Chilenski, 1982). Third, because anger is often associated with in-
tensity of experience, it offers a rich range of experience for pheno-
menological investigation (Richardson, 1918). Finally, insofar as
anger is related to harm inflicted on others, the task of uncovering
the multiple controls of anger is a socially useful one.
The paper is organized into three chapters. Chapter I presents
a desciption of Epstein's cognitive self-theory and introduces the
concept of dissociation. Next the phenomenology of dissociation and
depersonalization are described on the basis of a brief review of
clinical material. Finally, dissociative anger is identified from
viii.
clinical case material on the treatment of excessive anger.
Chapter II presents the hypotheses, the procedure, and
the results of a study undertaken in the form of multiple quan-
titative case studies. This research identifies several aspects
of dissociative anger.
Chapter III is a discussion of the significance of these re-
sults for Epstein's cognitive self-theory, for clinical applica-
tions in the control of anger, and for further research,
ix
ABSTRACT
Anger as a Dissociative Phenomenon:
A Contribution to an Integrated Theory of Personality
September, 1983
Gregory Michael Chilenski, B.A., Oakland University
M.A., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Seymour Epstein
The concept of dissociation was proposed to explain the struc-
tural relation between the emotions and a person's overall sense of
self. This discussion was based on Epstein's (1973, 1980b) cognitive
self-theory. Seven hypotheses were tested concerning the nature of
dissociative anger. Data were collected by subjects recording their
own anger experiences over several weeks. Grouped intra-subject
correlations showed that both anger at another and anger at oneself
are dissociative phenomena. It was also found that physical arousal,
disinhibition to attack, and the intensity of any emotion which
immediately replaces anger are all directly related to intensity of
dissociative experience. These relations are independent of any rela-
tions which exist between these variables and intensity of anger. Six
individual cases were quantitatively analyzed for idiosyncratic depar-
tures from the general trends in the grouped data. Implications for
psychopathology , for therapy, and for further research were discussed.
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CHAPTER I
COGNITIVE SELF-THEORY AND DISSOCIATIVE ANGER
Historically, the self- concept has been used as a central,
hierarchically superior, and order generating concept in many psy-
chological treatments of personality since the time of William
James. It could even be said that the continuous controversy be-
tween exponents of a social learning approach to personality (eg_.
Mischel, 1976; Bandura, 1977) and nearly all other approaches in
the field revolves around the issue of the usefulness of the self-
concept as a hypothetical contruct (eg_. Rogers, 1 967).
A distinctively cognitive and construct!' vi st approach to un-
derstanding the function of an individual's self-concept sees the
self-concept as being itself a system of concepts
...that is hierarchically organized and internally
consistent; that assimilates knowledge, yet, itself,
is an object of knowledge; that is dynamic, but must
maintain a degree of stability; that is unified and
differentiated at the same time; that is necessary for
sol ving problems i n the real world; and that is subject
to sudden collapse, producing total disorganization
when this occurs (Epstein, 1973).
In short, the self-concept is a self-theory. Viewed as a theory
which the individual constructs and maintains in order to struc-
ture experience and to direct a life, the self-theory can be evaluated
by the classical standards of scientific theory: extensivity, par-
simony, empirical validity, internal consistency, testability, and
1
2usefulness (Epstein, 1973; 1980). Just as the adaptiveness of a
scientific theory can be judged according to these criteria, so too
can the adaptiveness of a person's self-theory.
The extensiveness of a person's self-theory refers to an abili-
ty to cope with a wide variety of situations. This coping depends
on the person being aware of more facets of his or her feelings,
abilities, and personality characteristics than someone with a nar-
row self-theory. An extensive self-theory allows a person to be more
flexible and open to new experiences.
The parsimoniousness of a person's self-theory refers to the ef-
ficiency of its organization. That is, an efficient self- theory is
one which has both major and minor postulates hierarchically arranged.
The broad, integrative postulates refer to general guiding principles
such as, "I am a Christian." Minor postulates are situation-specific
empirical generalizations which guide immediate responses. A lack of
parsimony in the self-theory results in behavior being completely
situationally determined.
All self-theories are empirically derived, inductive construct
systems. They may differ, however, in their degree of empirical vali-
dity. Much human learning takes place vicariously. It is possible
for vicariously learned postulates to be preserved at the expense
of maintaining empirically invalid lower-order postulates. For
example, a child may learn to ignore his or her own experience in
order to preserve a distorted view of self learned from a pathogenic
3parent.
It is in the realm of internal consistency that a self-theory
differs most from a scientific theory. The importance of internal
consistency to the self-theory is not so much a matter of whether
there exist contradictory postulates, but more a matter of the per-
son's awareness of contradiction and inconsistency. Emotional ex-
perience offers the occasions for the person's experience of inter-
nal inconsistency. "I am (usually) a kind and loving person." is
not easily reconcilable with the empirically-based, "I just vicious-
ly attacked this person and hurt his feelings." It is argued below
that the organization of the emotions in the self- theory depends on
dissociated structure in order to avoid the strain of naturally-
occurring internal inconsistency.
Testability refers to the degree to which postulates in the
self-theory are available for di sconfi rmation
. It is assumed that
the invalidation of a self-theory postulate produced anxiety and the
more general the postulate, the more anxiety experienced when its
validity is threatened. It follows that because people tend to
avoid anxiety, higher-order postulates are less available for discon-
firmation than are lower-order postulates which are based on simple
empirical generalizations. For example, the general self-esteem
postulate, "I am a worthy person." is much less accessible to inva-
lidation than the empirical generalization, "I am a good ping-pong
pi ayer .
"
4Concerning the standard of usefulness, Epstein has proposed
three purposes of the person's self-theory. These are: a), to main-
tain a favorable pleasure/pain balance over the forseeable future,
b). to maintain a favorable level of self-esteem, and c). to assi-
milate the data of personal experience, which requires it to main-
tain its own organization. Both anxious and pleasant types of arou-
sal are associated with the success or failure of each of these pur-
poses. Developmentally, anxious and pleasant arousal states provide
the emotional building blocks for later differentiation of emotional
experience
.
The central significance of emotion in Epstein's cognitive self-
theory is clear:
Individuals unwittingly construct theories about them-
selves as a way of dealing with their world. Whether
they like it or not, they form concepts about emotion-
ally significant experiences that then serve to organ-
ize and guide their future behavior In the begin-
ning, when the child is mainly responsive to physical
needs, the self-theory is subordinate to the emotions.
However, in time this becomes reversed, as emotional
experience becomes increasingly mediated by the indi-
vidual's developing conceptual system. (Epstein, 1980a)
For Epstein there are at least three ways that emotions are re-
lated to the individual's self-theory. First, whenever the self-
theory succeeds at one of its functions (eg. assimilating the data
of experience; resolving inner contradictions), the person experi-
ences a satisfying exhileration
. If, on the other hand, there is a
temporary failure to fulfill a function, the person becomes anxious.
5Second, emotions are aroused whenever anything of significance to an
individual's self-theory occurs. For example a perceived threat to
the self might be responded to with anger or anxiety. A reduction
in self-esteem might be responded to with sadness. Self-esteem
enhancement of sel f- theoretic growth or development might be responded
to with joy or happiness. A challenge to the assimilative capacity of
the self-theory which is not perceived as threatening might be res-
ponded to with curiosity. Third, as Epstein has stated, "behind
almost every emotion there is a hidden cognition.
.
.it is how we inter-
pret events, not the events themselves, that determine the emotions
we feel ." (Epstein, 1980a)
It is for these three reasons that Epstein has paraphrased Freud
in saying that "emotions are the royal road to the self-theory." That
is, the intensive study of the emotional life of individuals is
Epstein's method of choice for describing their self-theories.
Implicit cognition
. The link between implicit cognition and emotion
has been described and clinically investigated by both Ellis (1973)
and Beck (1976). While Beck, Ellis, and Epstein differ from each
other in many significant ways, they would each maintain the princi-
ple that behind every emotion there is an implicit cognition. As
James would have it, "The emotion is the observation of the resonance
to the meani ng of things" (Linschoten, 1968). Whether cognitions are
in any final, causal sense prior to emotion, or vice versa , is a the-
6oretical question which will not be argued here. Both Beck and Ellis
pragmatically choose the causal direction to be from cognitions to
emotions: both have developed therapy techniques which focus inter-
vention on cognitions. Each explicitely states that emotion will
"follow suit." Epstein also sees cognition preceding emotion even in
chi 1 dhood.
In the present paper it is assumed with Beck, Ellis, and Epstein
that cognition precedes emotion. But there is reason to suspect that
the sequential relation is sometimes more complex than this. De-
ciding this question in any final theoretical sense must take into
account many important clinical observations. While it is true that
cognitive approaches to therapy assume a cognition-to-emotion causal
direction, there is also a great deal of evidence that a change in
emotional experience can lead to changed cognitions. Cathartic ther-
apy techniques (Breuer & Freud, 1937; Jackins, 1965; Janov, 1972;
Bach, 1974; Lowen, 1974) are based on the idea that the experience of
emotions in the present moment of therapy will create new experiences
which must then be assimilated into the person's ego or self-structure
It could be argued that this does not necessarily mean that cognitions
do not precede emotion. The issue here seems to depend on the meaning
of imp! icit cognition and whether it is possible for cognitions to
vary in their degree of implicitness. It seems prudent to avoid fore-
closing on either end of the cognition-emotion link and instead to
adopt a stance which allows for going from change in one element to
7change in the other, in either direction. This equivocation is not
the result of unclarity of thought but rather the result of an at-
tempt to remain faithful to the subjective experience of change in
psychotherapy.
A closer examination of Epstein's position regarding the rela-
tion between emotion and cognition will show that a cognition, as
one element of a complex self-theory, can itself occupy different
positions in the hierarchy of the self-theory. Since cognition fre-
quently connotes a single belief, Epstein uses the term postulate to
refer to higher-order or hierarchically superior cognitions. Postu-
lates at different hierarchical levels can influence or be influenced
by emotional experience and the generality of the postulate is related
to the qualities of the emotion. For example, the fundamental exhile-
ration experienced with self-theory success at assimilation of the da-
ta of a unique experience presumably engages more of the conceptual
system than the perfunctory solution of the daily cross-word puzzle.
Similarly, the incapacitating anxiety attendant upon first acknowledg-
ing a homosexual desire, for example, will implicate more of the per-
son's self-theory than, say, the person admitting that he doesn't know
how to give his own car a tune-up.
Postulates which are in direct conscious awareness and which gen-
erate immediate emotional reactions seem to reciprocally control or
influence smaller sub-hierarchies of the self-theory. Thus certain
features of emotional experience and expression such as intensity,
frequency, consciousness of stimulus, and others can be indices of the
8relative superior or subordinate level of the postulates involved.
C°9nition as used in thl's Paper refers, as its simplest sense,
to the beliefs and perceptions of the individual (Bieber, 1980).
However, because the self-theory is assumed to be a hierarchically
ordered structure of cognitive postulates, it becomes necessary to
distinguish between beliefs and perceptions which are either in aware-
ness, or readily accessible to it, and beliefs and perceptions which
are implicit. It is assumed that some of the central or hierarchi-
cally superior postulates are not easily accessible to awareness.
In addition, perceptual processes which involve emotion or emotionally
significant events are also outside of normal awareness. As was men-
tioned earlier, neither Ellis nor Beck address the issue of postulate
hierarchies and therefore they seem to find no need to make a dis-
tinction between explicit and implicit but explicable cognitions.
The concern with cognition is a concern with how people repre-
sent their world (including themselves) to themselves (Kelly, 1955).
The impl icit quality of a representation means that it is acted on,
yet is not formally explicit. It is sensed rather than reasoned.
Tacit knowing (Polyanyi, 1958) is another name for these phenomena.
Tacit knowing is knowledge which is a-critical or non-reflective. It
is, somewhat paradoxically, knowledge which is unspeci fiable, yet
the holding of it involves a personal commitment.
Implicit higher order self-theory postulates are representations
(or construals) or one's self to oneself. As Epstein (1973) has
stated, the self-theory is a highly significant part of the person's
9overall theory of reality. Sub-hierarchies within the self-theory,
organized around the memories of significant emotional experiences,
are complex cognitive structures which constitute people's "knowing
how" (Piaget, 1968) to be themselves.
Empjtion. Since the postulates of a person's self-theory are ordinar-
ily implicit, the relation between the postulates and emotion becomes
important for the study of self-theories. It can be assumed that
whenever an emotion is experienced, some significant events have
occurred with respect to the self-theory's functions. An emotion is
viewed, in cognitive self-theory terms, as an action-oriented subsys-
tem of the self-theory. Emotional sub-structures focus the person's
perceptions on selected aspects of the environment, ready the organism
for directed action, and prescribe comparatively more "automatic" res-
ponses for enactment than a non-emotional state of consciousness does.
This view is best illustrated by a discussion of Bower's (1981) asso-
ciated network theory of memory and emotion. Bower's theory was pro-
posed to explain the phenomena of state-dependent learning and memory,
but the model resembles so well the cognitive self-theory view of
emotion that it bears detailed treatment.
Bower cites numerous instances from everyday life and from his
own and others' experiments which show that under certain circumstances
"Memories acquired in one state are accessible mainly in that state but
are 'dissociated' or not available for recall in an alternate state"
(p. 130). From this account, Bower concludes that the affect-depen-
10
dent learning and memory produced in his experiments is experimentally-
induced dissociation.
emo-
The semantic-network approach to explaining dissociative
tional phenomena supposes that each distinct emotion such as anger,
depression, or fear has a specific node or unit in memory, we might
say in the self-theory, that collects together by associative pointers
many other aspects of the emotion.
Associative pointers indicate the direction which associa-
tions flow when the first in a series is activated above some threshold
of consciousness. Concepts formed about the self or about the worl d in
an emotional state are associated to that central emotional node
or hub. Dissociation is that structural phenomenon which means
that the concept or memory is not. available to consciousness in a
di fferent emotional state.
Included among the connections to an emotion node are associated
autonomic reactions, standard role and expressive behaviors, and des-
criptions of standard evocative situations which when appraised lead
to the emotion. Also included are verbal labels commonly assigned to
this emotion such as anger, rage, and fury. According to Bower, some
of these linkages are innate, while others are learned and elaborated
throughout acculturation. In addition, each emotion unit is also
linked with propositions or concepts describing events from one's life
during which that emotion was aroused.
Figure 1 shows a schematic for a small fragment of the many con-
11
nections to a given emotion node. (See p. 14.) As can be seen from
Figure 1, the association pointers for most connections go both ways
between the implicit conceptual element and the emotion node. In
addition, whole chains of memory connections can be set off, sym-
bolized by the connection between memo^ and memory One element in
the schematic which was added to Bower's is that labelled "confirming
appraisals." This signifies that the evocation of the emotion complex
entails an attention-focusing on the environment for further emotion-
relevant cues
.
The inhibitory connection between anger and some other
emotion node in the schematic is hypothetical in the sense that there
will be different degrees of inhibition or dissociation of other emo-
tion-related material for different self-theories.
The significance of Bower's work for cognitive self-theory is
that associative network theory provides a model for understanding
the central significance of emotion in the self-theory. In addition,
associative network theory fits within a general semantic-network
theory of long-term memory of the type common in cognitive psychology.
Associative network theory, which is very much like Hilgard's neo-
dissociation theory (1977), allows for divided off segments of the
sense of self which are more multi faceted than "repressed impulses"
or "split objects" (Gruenwald, 1977). As was noted, emotion nodes
are closely associated with autonomic, perceptual, cognitive, and
behavioral routines and their dissociation can be viewed, within limits,
as efficient organization in the self-theory.
12
FIGURE 1
Schematic for an Emotion-Node
Adapted from Bower (1981)
13
Self- theory unity. Epstein has expanded on the idea that one of the
purposes of the individual's self-theory is to assimilate the data of
personal experience while maintaining its own organization (1978).
After reviewing and theories of the self-concept of Goldstein, Lecky,
Snygg and Coombs, and Rogers, he concludes that "all the theorists
agree that there is essentially one basic need, which is to maintain
the unity of the individual's conceptual system." This unity prin-
ciple is seen as at least as important as any other principle of
motivation such as to seek pleasure and avoid pain or to maintain
self-esteem. The hierarchical organization of the self-theory and
the substance of the central postulates in part determine what is
pleasurable or painful. For example, winning at some sport will give
me more pleasure if I hold a postulate that I am a good amateur ath-
lete than it will if I do not hold such a postulate.
The unity maintaining activity of the self is seen as a kind
of equilibration between the organism and the environment. Unity
maintenance is a making sense of experience by a continuous assess-
ment which is directed both outward to the world, especially the
social world, and inward to the self-theory itself. One question
raised by this view is whether these processes of outward and inward
appraisal are carried out simultaneously or in turn. If the former,
then what is needed is a theory of co-consciousness much like Hilgard's
(1977) views concerning hypnosis. In brief, hypotic subjects can
report that they experience a split in consciousness: one conscious-
14
ness attends to the operator and the other monitors internal proces-
sing. Epstein's view that self-theory cognitions are implicit would
seem to indicate that the consciousness which assesses the self-
theory in an on-going way is also below awareness threshold. Perhaps
one thing which characterizes the hypnotic state is the raising of
this inward assessing consciousness into awareness.
When Epstein makes the analogy between the individual's self-
theory and the formal sense making activities of the empirical sciences,
this writer infers that the sense making activity of the self, govern-
ed by the unity principle is primary for cognitive self-theory. Pur-
suit of pleasure and avoidance of pain are normally hierarchically
subordinate as motivational constructs to the unity principle for
mature adults. Hence one can observe through history some people's
willingness to give up life itself in order to maintain certain cen-
tral postulates called ideological or religious. The pursuit of unity
may also explain the "neurotic paradox," that is, the tendency of the
neurotically anxious person to resist opportunities to change despite
the discomfort and unhappiness which their postulates engender. Sim-
ply stated, the neurotic's daily anxious discomfort is lower than the
anxiety he or she anticipates if a major change were to occur in basic
postulates of the self-theory in order to reduce the daily discomfort.
A general theory of psychological disturbance based on this view
will most easily begin with the simplest assumption: namely, "the
assumption that there is a general tendency to assimilate experience
15
into a single, unified conceptual system" (Epstein, 1978, emphasis
added). Disturbance, from this simplest assumption, occurs when there
is tension between discrepant information and the need to assimilate
the data of experience into a unified system. In normal living this
tension is quickly resolved by an assimilation of new experience
through a hierarchical rearrangement of the conceptual system itself
or by a modification of the content of one or more postulates. For
example, if I hold the postulate that I am good at chess and I begin
to lose a lot, I might subsume this postulate under a new one like,
"I enjoy playing board games, win or lose." Thus, I can now lose at
chess with much less damage to my self-esteem because I am confirming
a new higher-order postulate. Alternately, I could simply modify my
appraisal of my chess playing ability.
But when this assimilation cannot be accomplished, there will be
a tendency to dissociate the material which cannot be taken in. Dis-
sociation sets up a new tension within the self-theory because of the
opposed tendency of the unity principle. This "cognitive tension" is
experienced as anxiety. If I get anxious and angry in response to a
threatened disconfirmation of an important self-theory postulate, then
features of the event which threatens disconfirmation will be associa-
ted to both emotion nodes in the self-theory. In short, our emotional
reaction to the threat of self-theory disconfirmation increases dis-
sociation of the threatening material. These dissociated percepts,
concepts, and postulates are not repressed and transformed in a dyna-
16
mic unconscious, but are available to consciousness when the same
emotion is evoked later.
I have argued elsewhere (Chilenski, 1982b) that the symptoms, of
combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder are the results of these
two opposed tendencies in the self-theory. The self-referential per-
cepts, concepts, and postulates associated with combat trauma are
dissociated due to their fundamental incompatibility with the overall
self-theory. This dissociation is marked by the denial and numbing
phase of the stress-reaction characterized by amnesia, reduced acti-
vity, and restricted emotional range. But the operation of the unity
principle results in repeated attempts to assimilate these traumatic
self-referential data. This assimilation attempt is marked by repeti-
tive and intrusive nightmares, flashbacks, and guilt feelings. In the
delayed syndrome, assimilation is not accomplished and the pattern of
denial and numbing alternating with repetitive intrusion of the data
occurs again.
Dissociation and the self-theory
. As will be recalled, Epstein has
stated that an individual's self-theory may be evaluated by comparing
its efficacy for the person to the classical standards of scientific
theory. In this writer's view, Epstein raised the standard of inter-
nal consistency to a higher level of importance than the other stan-
dards by his later thoughts on the unity principle. It is the issue
of unity or internal consistency for which the phenomenon of dissocia-
tion has the most important implications. But the introduction of the
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concept of dissociation to cognitive self-theory is a less radical de-
parture from the unity principle than it might first appear to be.
For Epstein already recognized the non-rational, non-explicable, and
possibly non-unifiable core of the self in his use of emotions as a
central theoretical concept and as the phenomena of choice for study.
By studying the experience of emotion both perceptual and propriocep-
tive processes must be acknowledged. These processes occur and recur
outside of the person's normal awareness. Intensive study of the emo-
tions, leading to a more elaborated description of the individual's
self-theory, therefore requires both analytic modeling and experien-
tial investigation.
The existence of normal dissociation of self-theory material
around the emotions may mean that the person's individual self-theory
is ultimately non-unifiable. In short, the unity principle may have
its limits, and these limits are probably adaptive. A too rigid em-
phasis on unity within the self-theory will result in a lack of flexi-
bility and, in extreme cases, in the endangering of the entire self-
theory structure. Since the opposite of unity in the self-theory is
dissociation, it follows that some dissociation in the sel f-theory is
probably and potentially adaptive as well. Hence, the dissociation of
elements threatening to the overall self-theory occurs by our reacting
to them emotionally.
Within any given emotion-cluster of postulates, the unity prin-
ciple governs the integration of postulates. But between emotion-clus-
ters, dissociation may be the rule. Thus as emotions alternately be-
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come regnant, there occurs a shifting among different unities. That
is, there may be dominant different unities at different times. It
is a matter of preference as to whether one wishes to refer to such
a condition of shifting unities as a fundamental disunity. Epstein
prefers to see this situation through the lens of the unity principle.
This writer prefers to see it as a fundamental (and functional) disu-
nity in order to highlight the phenomenological perspective. That
is, the emphasis of this paper is on the experience of disunity
(dissociation) and its implications for the experience of anger.
The maintenance of organization in the self-theory may depend
both on the unity principle and on the ability to dissociate material
threatening to that unity. This dissociation occurs within emotional
experience. From this view, much of self-theory change in therapy can
be seen as the assimilating of previously dissociated self-theory ele-
ments. Epstein (1979) has argued that acute schizophrenic disorgan-
ization may be an evolutionary adaptive response in the human cognitive
system to a massive self-theory crisis brought on by the failure of
the self- theory to perform its essential functions. Schizophrenic
disorganization is itself described by him as the beginning of a
"paradigm shift" which leads to a self-theory revolution. Epstein
criticizes treatments of acute disorganization which fail to recognize
the potential in these episodes for adaptive reconsti tution or recon-
struction of the self. It may be that such total self-theory disor-
ganization results from a too rigid emphasis on unity in the person's
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sel f-theory
.
These paradigm shifts of the self-theory, ie. total self-
theory reorganization, refer to a significant change in higher
order postulates which result in transformations of the entire
personality. Such shifts of self-theory include religious conver-
sion, self transformation brought about by ascetic disciplines and
meditation, ideological brain washing, severe stress reactions, psy-
chosis, and personality change in depth psychotherapy.
A paradigm shift j_n the self-theory refers to a phenomenon
which is more common than these significant, usually radical^life
changes. The emergence into conscious awareness of dissociated as-
pects of the individual's self-theory constitutes such a paradigm
shift _i_n the self-theory. Depending on the degree of relative unifi-
cation/dissociation, an emotional experience can take on the quali-
ties of a momentary paradigm shift. From a strictly phenomenological
viewpoint, emotions are themselves ways in which we apprehend the
world. This position has been a long-standing one in philosophical
phenomenology (Sartre, 1956; Merleau-Ponty
,
1964) but it has not been
elaborated on by any psychologists since James. The factual ness of
this radical phenomenological view, however, is difficult to dispute.
It helps account for the difficulties encountered in eliciting peo-
ple's implicit cognitions. For on the phenomenological level, emo-
tions create our apprehension of our world. Emotions function as para-
digms for the person's moment-to-moment experience of himself and his
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world, the world-taken-for-granted.
The organization of significant elements of the self-theory
around different emotion clusters constitutes the availability to
the person of different emotion paradigms. A person knows how to
be angry or loving. But it is nearly impossible to be both at once.
Dissociation, then, is a normal limit to the forces of internal con-
sistency or unity which otherwise govern the functioning of the self-
theory. This basic phenomenological fact suggests that investigations
in this area should take into account the pre-reflective, the percep-
tual, and the proprioceptive levels of experience in addition to the
objectively apprehended cognitive and behavioral levels.
To summarize the argument thus far: the differentiation of an
individual's self-theory, and therefore his/her adaptability within a
wide range of emotional experience, is due to the separate clustering
of significant self-theory postulates around core emotional experi-
ences. Core emotional experiences are stored as memories and as readi-
ness to respond, that is, as perceptual and behavioral routines or pro-
grams. These emotional clusters are sub-hierarchies in themselves
which may be more or less interconnected with other sub-hierarchies.
Tenuously or sparsely connected sub-hierarchies are cognitions and
postulates which are dissociated from the more familiar and self-en-
hancing postulates in the self-theory. "Normal" postulate hierarchies
are those more readily available to conscious awareness. When the
dissociation of aspects of the self-theory is extreme, such as in post-
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traumatic stress reactions for example, an emotional experience can
have a quality of unreality - as if the emotion does not really belong
to the person experiencing it. Sometimes the unified self has the ex-
perience of "observing" some other self feeling the emotion and car-
rying it out into action. At other times the person may feel "pos-
sessed" by an alien emotional force.
From an associative-network view, these more extreme experiences
are the result of associative connections being made between the emo-
tion node and the details of an experience which is threatening to
the overall integrity of the self-theory. That is, dissociation of
threatening knowledge about oneself means that the knowledge remains
as potentially part of emotional experience, and it is not integrated
into the overall self-theory.
The phenomenology of dissociation
. From the perspective of psycho-
pathology dissociation is defined as an altered state of conscious-
ness involving a segregated group of mental processes which are se-
parate from normal consciousness but which function as a unitary whole
(Barnes, 1980). Since dissociative phenomena have been recognized,
dissociation has always been seen as "a weakness of psychological
synthesis (Janet, 1907). This "weakness" is seen as "a defense a-
gainst a danger-laden piece of psychic reality" (Dince, 1977).
The experience of dissociation can range from an awareness that
one is acting in a peculiar manner, to a feeling of acting in the con-
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un-
trol of an outside force, to having no awareness of one's actions
til afterwards (Schafer, 1981). Because of these experiences, deper-
sonalization is considered a prominent aspect of dissociation. Phen-
omenological reports of depersonalization appear in creative liter-
ature in most literate cultures. The best known form of depersonali-
zation in literature and myth is the phenomenon of "the double" (.Rank,
1971). While the phenomenon of "the double," a split-off and project-
ed other self, is very rare in its pure form, there is some evidence
that this extreme form of depersonalized dissociation occurs in par-
tial forms (Damos-Mova & Eacott, 1980).
What are the features of depersonalized dissociation? Most fre-
quently reported is a feeling of the mind or the self being detached
from the body (Noyes & Slymen, 1978; Shapiro, 1978; Barnes, 1980).
Sometimes this detachment can result in distortions in the perception
of one's body (Meares & Grose, 1978; Blue, 1979). Hyperalertness can
either accompany the perceptual distortion of the body or can occur
alone. This hyperalertness to the environment is especially focused
on threatening features (Noyes & Slymen, 1978; Renik, 1978).
More extreme than detachment from the body is the experience of
a detached part of the self cooly observing the rest of the acting
self, the so-called "observing ego" (Renik, 1978; Shapiro, 19.78;
Barnes, 1980). Feelings of self control are altered (Blue, 1 979) so
that a person may report he was "not himself" (Barnes, 1980) or that
the whole episode was "unreal" (Noyes & Slymen, 1978) and almost as
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though he was "not there" (Shapiro,
the experience of oneself as if the
ton (Shapiro, 1978).
1978). Finally, there can be
self were an actor or an automa-
Dissociative anger
.
There is some evidence that extreme anger is an
occasion for depersonalized dissociation. It will be recalled that
there is no restriction on the kinds of associations which can be
made to an emotion-node in the self-theory. This means that memories
of being angry a_nd of being the target of anger are associated and
therefore both triggered by the experience of anger. The more
threatening the accompanying memories, percepts, imagery, and im-
pulses to the overall self-theory, the more dissociated from the inte-
grated self is the entire anger complex. A cognition can be threat-
ening to the self- theory because it cannot be integrated, because it
lowers self-esteem, or because it produces painful feelings or beha-
vior. This structural relation between anger and the more integrated
emotions is likely to produce the subjective phenomena of depersona-
lized dissociation when the person becomes angry.
Clinical case reports on the direct treatment of excessive anger
are few (Frost, 1981; Chi lenski, 1982), and among this literature only
a few reports give some insight into the phenomenology of anger. It
has been noted that psychotherapy clients presenting problems of anger
control usually experience their anger as occuring suddenly and cycli-
cally. They complain that their anger seems to arise out of nowhere;
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that is, they report their anger is experienced as uni ntegrated with
their basic sense of self. As further proof of this, the person
usually expresses disapproval of the anger and guilt over its con-
sequences (Spiegal, 1980).
Excessive anger is often observed to be a defense against threats
to a tenuously integrated sense of self (Bonirae, 1976). Both Adler
(1956) and Fromm-Reichmann (1950) described the existence of a per-
sonality type which uses anger not merely as a defense against an-
xiety but as the very basis for its tenuous integration and sense of
identity.
One type of clinical case in which these processes emerge is in
the treatment of child abusers. As for the role of anger in child
abuse, data from a representative nationwide sample of incidents of
child abuse reported to law enforcement agencies (Gil, 1970) indicate
that "disciplinary measures, against the child taken in uncontrollable
anger" is a frequent antecedent of child abuse. Out of a sample of
thirty-six cases of fatal child abuse (Weston, 1974), the reason for
injury presented by the parent involved difficulties with crying,
toileting, or feeding in 78% of the cases. All of these children were
under six years of age; most were under eighteen months. It seems,
then, that in most cases of child abuse, it can be assumed that anger
plays a role and that the anger is of a severe, pathological nature.
It is clear that child abuse is a mul ti -generational problem.
The evidence is overwhelming that the child abuser was him or herself
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abused as a child (Green, 1976; Kreindler, 1976; Blumberg, 1977; 1979;
Steele, 1978). There is also strong evidence to the effect that the
child abuser suffers from low self-esteem and maintains immature or
shallow relations with other adults. This is generally traced to
the abuser's history of abuse as a child.
The child abuser has also been described as failing to develop
a basic sense of trust as Erikson (1954) described it.
As a result
these patients develop an identity based on a loose
collection of uni ntegrated, disparate concepts of
the se1f
-
They can feel like a confident parent and
quickly change to being nothing but a helpless, in-
effectual, inadequate child. They can be a kindly
3 dult and shift suddenly to being a punitive adult.
(Kreindler, 1976, emphasis added)
The "sudden shifting" described here is a common experience of
the child abuser. The following personal account is from a woman
who killed her three-year old son who had been born premature and
with a birth defect.
I blamed myself for both the premature birth and the
defect... I was so full of fear of harming the babies
...I was overcome with guilt and the fear that I
would end up taking my frustrations out on the kids
... The night (it occurred I was) extremely depressed
...something in me seemed to snap and I began slapping
his face--hard, crying all the time. ..I knew what was
going on but it was as if my mind were above it all,
watching. (Dabney, 1976)
We can conclude that there are dissociated areas of the self-theory,
arranged around key emotional experiences (usually derived from a
personal history of abuse) which "take over" in interpreting the
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child abuser's experience and in directing his or her actions. Pos-
sible mechanisms for this process will be described below.
The violent offender who is treated as an outpatient, another
type of clinical case where excessive anger is at issue, tends to
engage in multiple assaultive episodes which rarely involve planning
or property crimes. This fact itself differentiates this group from
the inpatient or incarcerated violent offender. Outpatient offenders,
in general, lack the antisocial attitudes which characterize the in-
patients. Indeed, they tend to express a consistent set of pro-social
values. This suggests that there exists a lack of integration in
their sense of self. (Carney, 1977).
The outpatient violent offender tends to have an exaggerated sense
of his own importance and an inability to see his own limitations. This
leads to levels of aspiration far in excess of his abilities and to
frequent conflicts with others, especially with authority figures
(Danto, 1975; Sadoff, 1975; Carney, 1977). Violent patients are them-
selves disturbed by their loss of control. They actually fear losing
control; at the same time, the hypervigilance required if they are to
maintain control exhausts them. Therapy with these patients emphasizes
the therapist's role as the patient's "auxilliary ego" (Kuehn & Burton,
1969).
It is difficult to judge from the above published reports just
what the relationship is between the violent outpatient's aggressive
outbursts and feelings of anger. Nevertheless their impulsiveness and
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self-defeating patterns are cited so frequently that we must at least
suspect that anger is involved most of the time. This conclusion is
based first, on the unpremeditated nature of most of their assaul-
tive episodes. Second, anger serves as a form of social justifica-
tion for aggressive acts in many places and circumstances in our cul-
ture (Aver! 11
,
1979)
.
Summarizing what can be gleaned from the clinical literature on
the personalities of violent offenders and child abusers, one finds
that their anger results from two sources. One cause for their anger
is the experience of loss or deprivation (Bonime, 1976). Another cause
is their own attempt to avoid further loss to an already weak ego or
self-structure (Spiegal, 1980). The self-structure's weakness is
shown by its exaggerated and idealized nature or by its fragmentation.
Anxiety characterizes the anticipation of further loss and the antici-
pation of the consequences of their anger and impulsiveness (Madden
& Lion, 1978). The anxiety in turn leads to an even greater sense of
threat.
In the case of the child abuser, what exactly is dissociated?
One possibility is that as an abused child the future abuser is forced
to maintain two incompatible sets of postulates concerning the self-child
and the abusing parent. Because the child is dependent on the abus-
ing parent in spite of the abuse, the child forms postulates about
the parent that maintains a view of him/her as good and right. Pos-
tulates concerning the reality of the situation are dissociated. Each
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set of good-parent postulates and pad-parent postulates is associated
with "bad me" postulates. The "logic" may be: "This good parent
treats me bad when I am bad." That the parent is also bad remains
unintegrated
.
These postulates do not disappear into a dynamic unconscious but
are associated with one or more emotion-nodes. The likely emotion-
nodes to which the "bad parent-bad me" postulates are associated are
anger and fear. During abuse the child fears the abusing parent but
cannot flee, the child becomes angry but cannot attack. During the
adult, parenting years, anger or anxiety resulting from the normal
frustrations and household calamities of child-rearing evoke these
"bad parent-bad me" postulates. The misbehaving child becomes a
stimulus for the sudden collapse of self-esteem, and for the raising
of unintegra table self-theory material in the parent. Because the
abuser's "good parent" postulates are hierarchically superior and
usually regnant, this self-image is reasserted by the parent behaving
as the previous parent did. Thus the parent becomes a "good parent"
punishing a "bad child." Of course if the punishment causes physical
harm, a new round of anxiety-anger-dissociation is likely to occur in
the self-theory so that the intensity of dissociative anger increases
and is experienced in a subsequent episode.
A hypothetical mechanism for the violent outpatient offender is
more difficult to present because there is no single childhood percur-
ser for violent outbursts as there is for child abuse. But this
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mechanism must be similar to that of the child abuser's. It proba-
bly involves the integration of a set of ideal self-other postulates
and the simultaneous dissociation of both empirically valid and ex-
tremely negative self-other postulates. The dissociated postulates
are associated with anger and perhaps fear and are evoked in the vio-
lent offender in the same way it occurs for the abusing parent. That
is, the appearance of a situation that otherwise evokes anger or fear
in most people also evokes a sudden drop in self-esteem of the violent
offender because it challenges the integrated self-ideal and brings
into focus the previously dissociated self-theory material. Since
most such offenders are male, it could be hypothesized that the ideal
which is treatened is the postulate hierarchy concerning images of
one's own maleness which were formed out of earlier cognitions concern-
ing the father figure.
General summary . The out-of-control nature of excessive anger is both
an objective, observable feature when it occurs and it is an internal,
subjective experience which changes the quality of the person's anger.
Phenomenological ly, the qualities of dissociative anger closely resem-
ble features of depersonalization. Dissociative anger involves an
experienced split between self and body, sometimes to the point of
experiencing a second, observing self. It can involve a feeling of
acting as if an automaton. There can be feelings of unreality about
the self and about the situation. There can be a hypersensitivity to
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perceived threats to the self, and accompanying distortions of body
sensations and perception. Finally, these symptoms and the knowledge
of being out of control, or nearly so, serve to increase the already
experienced anxiety.
The increased anxiety of dissociative anger is its most dis-
turbing feature from a self-theory point of view. This is so since
anger is dissociated in the first place in order to avoid the anxiety
which is attendant upon integrating anger into the overall sense of
self. TtiTS increased anxiety serves as a kind of negative feedback
mechanism in the self-theory, causing a "shut-down" of the anger sub-
system. It would be expected, then, that a dissociative anger episode
would be quick to end once the depersonalized dissociation is experi-
enced
.
In summary, it is argued that the concept of dissociation is a
necessary one in accounting for the central role of emotion in cogni-
tive self-theory. Bower's associative network theory of memory and
emotion provides a useful model for understanding the structure of
dissociation within an overall integrated self-theory.
Self- theory relevant elements of any emotional episode which can-
not be integrated into the overall sense of self are associated to the
emotion sub-system and hence dissociated from the integrated sense
of self. In a purely theoretical sense, dissociation is the natural-
ly-occurring, adaptive structural relation among the emotions and be-
tween the emotions and the overall self-theory. This is because of the
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experiential ly unique, action-oriented, and focused perceptual rou-
tines set into motion by each emotion. It is argued here that dis-
sociation of emotion is normal, but it can reach "abnormal" or dys-
functional degrees as in the case of anger resulting in child abuse
and other violent offenses.
Anger was chosen- as a demonstration case for this general view
because anger is likely to have associated to it more cognitions and
memories of a non-integrated kind than other emotions. There is some
evidence from the literature on the treatment of excessive anger that
symptoms of depersonalized dissociation are present during excessive
anger episodes.
Chapter II presents several specific hypotheses concerning disso-
ciative anger. Also reported is a study which tested these hypotheses
with a sample of people with presumably normal degrees of dissociation
between anger and their integrated sense of self.
CHAPTER II
EVIDENCE FOR DISSOCIATIVE ANGER
Based on the preceeding description of dissociation and on the
theoretical argument in Chapter I, six items were created which mea-
sure an aspect of dissociation. These items are:
You had a feeling of impending disaster at the peak of
of your anger.
At the peak of your anger you felt that you might be
passing the "point of no return," as if your anger had
a mind of its own.
You had a feeling of being detached from your anger, a
detached part of yourself cooly observed your anger,
and that detached part didn't experience the anger.
When you passed the peak of your anger you had a feeling
of "What happened? How could I have done that? Was it
really me?"
You had a feeling as if another person had gotten angry,
as if it were not really you.
You had a feeling as if part of your judgement was suspended
during part of the incident and you were automatically
reacting to events outside of your control
.
These six items were combined into an index of dissociation which
was used to test the following seven hypotheses.
Hypotheses and their rationale
.
Strong anger-out as a dissociative phenomenon . Episodes of in-
tense anger at another person (anger-out) are viewed as dissociative
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phenomena. This is true for several reasons. First, anger-out usu-
ally requires action whereas anger at self (anger-in) does not. There-
fore anger-out is more likely than anger-in to be organized within the
person's conceptual system as a discrete action-oriented sub-system.
Second, there are more learned prohibitions against the outward ex-
pression of anger than against anger at oneself. These prohibitions
set up an anxiety barrier between the larger conceptual system and the
anger sub-system. This functionally and structurally separate action
system is experienced as something like "an aspect of me that is not
me" when anger is strong. Hence we can naturally observe people say,
"He was not himself." or "I was not myself." when someone expresses
strong anger which is disapproved. Third, certain perceived situations
(perceived stimuli) will tend to magnify dissociative experiences
because the situation includes a perceived threat to the person's
sense of self. Anxiety is increased by this threat. The impulse to
express strong anger is at least in part a form of anxiety avoidance.
The actual expression of anger is an attempt to avoid an anxiety pro-
voking situation by altering it. Viewed from the perspective of per-
sonal construct theory (Kelly, 1955), anger is an attempt to force
confirmation of an already disconfirmed self-referential construct.
The following two hypotheses follow from these considerations.
Hypothesis One : Anger-out (item #1) is a dissociative phenomenon
and anger-in (item #2) is not. It is hypothesized that intensity of
dissociation is positively correlated with intensity of felt anger-out,
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and that there is no significant correlation of dissociation with
intensity of felt anger-in.
Hypothesis Two: Anxiety (item #3) is positively correlated
with intensity of dissociation since prohibitions against anger-out
and perceived threats to self make dissociative anger-out an anxiety
related phenomenon. This relation is independent of the direct rela-
tion between intensity of anger-out and intensity of anxiety.
Dissociative Anger as Alienation From the Body
From a phenomenological perspective, one experiences strong
impulses to action, in this case to express anger, in one's body.
To the extent that these impulses are unacceptable to the self, a
person who is aware of physical and/or physiological changes during
anger will likely experience such body changes as alien to the self,
as a kind of "betrayal by the body." Nonawareness of the functioning
of the physical body probably contributes to a subjective sense of
self-integration (Sartre, 1956). We are usually unaware of physical
and physiological functioning until these functions depart from base-
line in arousal or until dysfunction occurs such as in pain or illness
Even in these cases, the self may succeed in re-integrating these body
experiences into a relatively unified self-theory.
Dissociative anger-out will be accompanied by an increased aware-
ness of physical or physiological changes. The awareness of these
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body changes will increase one's sense of self-alienation or non-
integration. Therefore the more physical arousal and/or change ex-
perienced in anger episodes, the more intensively dissociation will
be experienced in those episodes.
Hypothesis Three: The index of dissociation is positively
correlated with items which measure the experience of physical arou-
sal and/or changes (items *6 through #14). This relation is indepen-
dent of the direct relation between intensity of anger-out and the
itensity of physical arousal.
Dissociative Anger-out as Disinhi bition to Attack
Visual imagery
. Spontaneous visual imagery occurs as a private
event and is highly idiosyncratic. When it occurs in an interpersonal
exchange it is usually highly disruptive to that exchange (Rayher,
1978). The occurrance of spontaneous visual imagery in an interper-
sonal exchange could also be an index of how severe a disruption to
the self that exchange is.
One way the anger sub-system may be linked to the overall self-
theory is through organized visual percepts depicting aspects of the
person's history with the emotion of anger, either as an actor or as
a target or both. These links are then experienced as spontaneous
visual imagery as the anger sub-system is activated. An absence of
a linkage between the anger sub-system and the usually dominant self-
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system would render the anger sub-system completely dissociated
("= unconscious?). Multiple links consisting in verbal, visual, and
other types of percepts would indicate an anger sub-system which is
well integrated into the self. "Normal" dissociation of a relative-
ly self-alien anger sub-system may depend on visual percepts to acti-
vate and to guide the anger.
Questions which assess the occurrance of spontaneous visual imag-
ery ask for reports of images involving attack of others (item #68),
rejection of others (item #69), being attacked (item #70), being re-
jected (item #71), and being deprived by another (item #72).
Hypothesis Four : Intensity of dissociation is positively corre-
lated with the intensity of the spontaneous visual imagery of attacking
others (item #68). This relation is independent of the direct rela-
tion between intensity of anger-out and intensity of attack imagery.
Impulses to attack
.
In most instances, attacking others is a
socially prohibited response to an anger-inducing situation. To the
extent that this social prohibition is internalized, the felt impulse
to attack will increase feelings of depersonalization and self-aliena-
tion. On the other hand, increased overall feelings of dissociation
serve to inhibit the dominant integrated and integrating self and this
makes actual attack of others more likely.
Hypothesis Five : Impulses to attack (item #82) are positively
correlated with intensity of dissociation.
Hypothesis Six : Actual verbal or behavioral attack (item #99)
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is positively correlated with intensity of dissociation. Both these
relations are independent of the direct relations between intensity
of anger-out with intensity of impulse to attack or intensity of ac-
tual attack.
Dissociative Anger-out as Non-integration in the Self-theory
Proneness to dissociative anger is an index of the person's
lack of integration in the self-theory. Lack of self-theory integra-
tion will result in shifts of emotion which are seen as sudden by
others, and which are experienced as unaccountable by the person.
Non-integration of the anger sub-system with the overall self- theory
will make it difficult for the person to terminate voluntarily his or
her anger in a controlled or gradual way. A sudden shift into another
emotional state, i_e. the domination of the self-theory by another
action-oriented sub-system, becomes one way of managing this disinte-
grative experience.
Items #120 through #123 of the questionnaire are introduced by
the request for the subject to focus on the moment after the primary
behavior was carried out and to indicate whether the anger was "imme-
diately replaced" by another emotion. Given the necessity of shift-
ing out of dissociative anger in order to terminate it, it is hypothe-
sized that a successful shift requires a replacement emotion of inten-
sity equal to the intensity of dissociation.
Hypothesis Seven : The intensity of the emotion that immediately
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replaces the person's anger (item #123) is positively correlated
with the intensity of dissociation in the episode. This relation is
independent of the direct relation between intensity of anger-out and
intensity of the replacement emotion, if any.
Procedure
Subjects
.
Subjects were volunteers, from among students enrolled
in undergraduate psychology courses and from the writer's personal
social network. Students participated for experimental credits,
while others did so out of their own interest. A total of fifty-
five undergraduate psychology students were recruited as subjects. Ten
completed the required fifteen Anger Episode Records. Seven personal
acquaintances or friends of the writer were also recruited. Three
finished the study.
All subjects filled out a pre-screeni ng questionnaire. This
questionnaire is a personality inventory (AFD Personality Question-
naire, Epstein, 1980), containing 94 self statements that the subject
marks either true or false. From this inventory a subscale of conflict
over hostility can be derived.
The conflict over hostility subscale for 56 subjects screened
yielded a distribution of scores with J = 23.11; sd = 8.00 (data from
6 subjects were unusable). Ten subjects were recruited whose scores
were in the top quartile of the distribution and half of these even-
tually dropped out before completing the study. In addition, ten other
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subjects, roost of whose scores were below the median of the distribu-
tion, were also recruited and half of these subjects dropped out.
Three of the acquaintances finished the study. The total subject
N who completed 15 episode records was 13 out of a total recruitment
after screening of 27. Subjects dropped out at various points in the
study, but over half did so after the initial instruction session.
Most of the rest left after completing only one anger record. This
52% dropout rate will be discussed further in Chapter III.
Method
. Appropriate informed consent forms were used for all
subjects. All aspects of the research were revealed to the subjects
beforehand except to identify the items assessing dissociation. Be-
yond this the subjects were treated as the co-investigators they rapid-
ly become in this form of research. This one concealment seemed neces-
sary because the term dissociation may be one which implies a negative
evaluation to some people. Subjects' reactivity to this would other-
wise be uncontrolled.
The basic contract with the subjects required that they attend
two 1*2 hour sessions with the investigator. In the first meeting
subjects were instructed how to fill out the Anger Episode Record.
The second session, a week later, was used to collect supplementary
data, to check on the accuracy of the subjects' work, and to ensure
that subjects' understanding of all instructions reached a satisfac-
tory criterion.
Subjects were asked to fill out a complete Anger Episode Record
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whenever they got angry and to do so within twenty-four hours of
the anger episode. They turned in their Records every week. Subjects
agreed to supply a minimum of fifteen Records for analysis. The cri-
terion for deciding whether an anger episode should be recorded was
that subjects experienced some physical arousal; even slight arousal
was sufficient. The instructions read: "The anger episode should be
one in which you actually felt an increase in tension or physiologi-
cal arousal, and did not simply think that you disapproved of some-
thing and should be angry." Previous pilot testing with a similar
population showed that many subjects could average about three epi-
sodes per week.
The Anger Episode Record is a questionnaire which is organized
into a preliminary worksheet and 123 questions responded to on a com-
puter-scan sheet. It requires thirty to forty- five minutes to com-
plete. The worksheet allows space for the subject to write a brief
narrative of the episode. On the bottom half of the worksheet the
subject fills out a schema for the episode based on a division of the
episode into the objective stimulus, the perceived stimulus, the felt
emotion, the felt impulses to action, and the actual behavior carried
out. After filling in the schema with his or her own words, the sub-
ject uses a standardized list of stimulus and response labels to trans-
late his or her words into codifiable data. Once this is completed,
the subject begins the second part of the Record.
The questions which must be answered are arranged into sections
41
identical to the five parts of the schema. Most of the 123 items
are scored on a five-point scale with a blank indicating that the
item does not apply. The items have been created to allow for a
broad range of behavioral, cognitive, and physical experiences. It
was expected that many items would be left blank on any single record.
The content of the items was developed to test the above hypotheses
and to gather general data about anger.
Most statistical analyses were conducted with a handheld cal-
culator. The data from the 123-item questionnaire were edited by
using the information on the Anger Episode Record worksheet as a check
of accuracy in filling in the multiple choices on the scan sheet. The
numerical data entries were valued at 0 to 5.
Most items on the questionnaire are answered on five-point scales
which call for subjects' estimates of the intensity of the experience
described. (The entire Anger Episode Record is Appendix A.) The res-
ponse scale usually ranges from "slight" to "extreme" intensity. Tran-
scribing subjects' responses to a scale of 1 to 5 (with 0 being "does
not apply") produces, in most cases, ordinal scale data. A few items
(eg. #42 to #45, identifying the target of the anger) produce nominal
scale data.
Epstein (1982) has demonstrated that data gathered in this manner
can be analyzed in several ways when sampling over subjects, over
occasions, and over variables simultaneously. Because of the final
subject N (13), only grouped intra-subject and individual intra-sub-
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ject relationships between variables over occasions were analyzed.
Grouped intra-subject correlations are obtained by eliminating inter-
subject variance by presenting a subject's score on a given variable
as a standard score around the individual's mean. The transformed
data can then be pooled across subjects and analyzed for common in-
tra-subject variation. Such correlations are equivalent to the ave-
rage of the individual intra-subject ocrrelations among all subjects.
Correlation matrices for each individual subject describe the
ebb and flow of variables for a single subject across the episodes
reported by that subject. These correlations describe individual
patterns of anger. By comparing the matrix for an individual subject
with the matrix for the grouped intra-subject data, idiosyncratic de-
partures from the group averages can be identified.
Resul ts
.
Hypotheses one through seven were tested using grouped
intra-subject correlations. Table 2 presents the between-subjects
means and standard deviations for all variables along with grouped
intra-subject correlations for selected variables with the dissocia-
tion index. (Table 2 is on pages 45-46.)
It should be noted that r's based on very low frequencies can
be spuriously high. Therefore where the mean value of a variable is
less than .5, the r's were not computed. This is not the case, how-
ever, for items which eventually comprise a scale, ie, the dissocia-
tion items and the physical change items.
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Table 1 presents the grouped intra-subject intercorrelation for
the variables used to assess aspects of dissociation. (Table 1 is on
page 44.) As can be seen from Table 1, each item is significantly
correlated with every other item (p is significant at least at the
.05 level). In order to estimate the internal consistency of reliabi-
lity of combining these six items into a single scale, the Spearman-
Brown formula was used. This is a general formula for estimating in-
creased reliability of a scale with increased scale length (Ferguson,
1971). This calculation is based on the average inter-item correlation
multiplied by 6 since in this case six items are being combined. The
average inter- item correlation is, r = .31; the reliability coeffi-
cient for the six-item scale, a measure of internal consistency, is,
All six items were combined by adding their values. A value for
this dissociation index was created for every subject's fifteen epi-
sodes. This index was used to test all hypotheses. Hereafter, dis-
sociation (DISSO) refers to feelings of: impending disaster, passing
a point of no return, detached observing of oneself, unreality, deper-
sonalization, and automatic acting.
Hypothesis one . Hypothesis One stated that strong anger-out is a
dissociative phenomenon and anger-in is not. As can be seen from
Table 2, both anger-out (r - .35) and the partial correlation for
anger-in (r = .14) are significantly positively correlated with disso-
Table 1
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Table 2
Between-Subjects Means and SD's for all Variables; and
Grouped Intra-Subject Correlations for Selected Variables
with Dissociation and with Anger-Out. (N = 13 Subjects)
Variable Mean SD
DISSO
^Uf 1 cldtl
DISSO
ons
ANG-OUT df
Di ssociation
r partial r
index (DISSO) 2.46 4 .45
**
i yj
Anger-out 3.29 1 .20
**
.35***
i yo
Anger-i
n
1 .03 1 .43 .07
**
.14 -.17** 193
Anxi ety
.84 1 .39
**
f 29***
**
.
27**
.14 103
Physical change
i ndex 4. 70 5 .66
**
i
37***
**
t
24***
**
.51*** 193
muscle tension 1.47 1 .58
**
29***
.15**
1
3"]*** 193
scalp tension .19 .76
**
.36***
**
.
34***
.14 88
headache
.26 .88 .26** t 22*** .16* 118
tremor or
**
.32***shaking .35 1 .06
**
.27 ** < 21*** 133
i ncreased
.31***heart rate .97 1 .51
*
163
changes in
Drea in i ng . 62 1 . 30
**
.
34***
*
.23**
**
_
42*** 163
u 1 TT I CU
1
Zy
** **
swal lowi ng .09 .44 .37** .30** 28** 73
voice changes
k-k **
-k-k
.43 1 .30 .38*** .29**
.
38*** 133
tears .20 .73 .12 .06 .20** 133
visual imagery
of:
attacking other .42 1 .23
**
_
3g***
103
rejecting other .63 1 .45 .01 -.15 133
being attacked .15 .72 73
being rejected .52 1 .22 0 .06 -.15 148
being deprived .59 1 .32 -.13 -.18* .11 133
(continued on next page)
Table 2
(continued)
Between-Subjects Means and SD's for all Variables; and
Grouped Intra-Subject Correlations for Selected Variables
with Dissociation and with Anger-Out. (N = 13 Subjects)
Vari able
Impulse to
attack
Attack, verbal
or behavioral
Replacement
emotion inten-
sity
Mean SD Correlations
DISSO DISSO ANG-OUT
r partial r r
1.57 2.02
32 1.10
1.65 1.60 . 19v
**
25***
.13* ( 40***
df
12* 02
193
133
193
Individual var-
iables for the
dissociation in-
dex:
impending disas-
ter
point of no re-
turn
detached and
observi ng
unreality after-
ward
"It wasn't me."
acting automa-
tical ly
.50
.38
.58
.26
.24
1.21
1.07
1.29
.90
.89
.50 1.20
*p significant at the .05 level
**p significant at the .025 level
***P significant at the .01 level
p significant at the .005 level
**
**
**
***p significant at the .0005 level
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ciation. It should be noted that all correlations with dissociation
discussed here (except for dissociation with anger-out) are first-
order partial correlation coefficients (Ferguson, 1971) with the
effect of anger-out removed from both dissociation and the variable
of interest. Anger-out shows a stronger relation to dissociation
than does anger-in. The main point of Hypothesis One is supported by
these results, although the relation of anger-in with dissociation
means that dissociative phenomena occur with anger at oneself inde-
pendently of the occurrance of anger-out. This is a more complicated
result than was expected. The negative relation between anger-out and
anger-in (r = -.17) also supports the partial correlation result. A
t^test of the difference between the correlations for dissociation
with anger-in y_s. anger-out with anger-in was also made (Ferguson,
1971, p. 171). This is a test of which of either dissociation or an-
ger-out is a better predictor of anger-in. It was found that dissocia-
tion predicts anger-in better than does anger-out (_t = 3.91, £ <.0005).
This is a result which, when considered with the above results concern-
ing this, first hypothesis, requires considerable discussion which will
be presented in Chapter III.
Hypothesis Two . Hypothesis two stated that anxiety is directly related
to dissociation. As can be seen from Table 2, with the effect of an-
ger-out removed, anxiety shows a positive correlation with dissocia-
tion (r = .27) and no significant relation with anger-out. Thus Hypo-
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thesis Two is confirmed.
Hypothesis Three. Hypothesis Three stated that dissociative anger is
directly related to physical arousal and/or change. In order to test
this hypothesis, a single index of physical change was constructed
from the nine items which assessed different physical changes. Table
3 reports the grouped intra-subject intercorrelations for these vari-
ables. (Table 3 is on page 49.) As can be seen from Table 3, all
but three of the thiry-six intercorrelations are significant at least
at the jj = .05 level. The Spearman-Brown reliability coefficient,
based on an average inter-item correlation of .35, for nine items is,
r
kk
= .83. The nine items were combined to form a single index of
physical change for each of the fifteen episodes of every subject.
As can be seen in Table 2, overall physical change is positively
related to dissociation after the effect of anger-out is removed (r =
.24). Of course, as would be expected, physical change is also re-
lated to anger-out (r = .51). Hypothesis Three is confirmed.
A t-test of the difference between the correlations for disso-
ciation and for anger-out was also made. Anger-out is the better pre-
dictor of physical change (t_ = -3.83, £ <.0005). This is not a sur-
prising result given the large role of physical arousal in anger.
Hypothesis Four . Hypothesis Four stated that dissociative anger is
directly related to the spontaneous occurrance of visual imagery of
49
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attacking others. Questions were developed to assess other possible
spontaneously occurring visual images. As can be seen from Table 2,
dissociation is not related to visual imagery of attack. Imagery
of rejecting (r = .39) the other are related to anger-out. Hypothe-
sis Four is not confirmed.
Hypotheses Five and Six
. Hypotheses Five and Six stated that impulses
to attack and actual verbal of behavioral attack are related to disso-
ciation. As can be seen from Table 2, after the effect of anger-out
is removed, impulses to attack is related (r = .13) but actual attack
is not. This pattern is repeated for anger-out; impulse to attack is
related (r = .40) and actual attack is not. Hypothesis Five is con-
firmed and Hypothesis Six is not confirmed.
T- tests of the differences between the correlations for dissocia-
tion and for anger-out with impulses and with actual attack were made.
Anger-out is the better predictor of impulses to attack (t = -3.58,
£ <.0005). Neither variable predicts actual attack better than the
other (t = - .31
, n.s. )
.
Hypothesis Seven . Hypothesis Seven stated that the intensity of the
emotion which immediately replaces anger is directly related to the
intensity of dissociation experienced. As can be seen from Table 2,
there is a direct relation between the intensity of replacement emo-
tions and dissociation (r = .12) when the effect of anger-out is re-
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emoved. There is no relation of this intensity measure to anger-out.
Hypothesis Seven is confirmed.
High dissociation and low dissociation subjects
.
This method of
data collection and analysis allows for the quantitative as well as
the qualitative analysis of individual cases. Individual cases were
selected for closer examination on the basis of rank-ordering the thir-
teen subjects on their average dissociation scores over fifteen epi-
sodes
.
The top six subjects were designated the High Dissociation Sub-
jects. Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, and correla-
tions of interest for the High Dissociation and the Low Dissociation
groups. (Table 4 is on pp. 52-53.) As can be seen from Table 4,
these groups differ in their average dissociation index score such
that for High Dissociation Subjects, X = 3.92, and for Low Dissocia-
tion Subjects, X = 1.20. By t-test (for populations with unequal
variances), the difference between these means is significant (t_ =
4.304, p< .0005, 1 -tailed). Interestingly, the means for anger-out
for the two groups are nearly equal (t = .346, n.s.). Thus any other
differences between these groups can be attributed to differences in
dissociation intensity with more confidence. It should also be noted
in this context that the groups do not significantly differ on their
average scores for the conflict over hostility sub-scale of the pre-
screening questionnaire (t = 1.27, df = 11; n.s.). (The interested
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Table 4
Between-Subjects Means & SD's & Grouped Intra-Subject
Correlations for Selected Variables:
High Dissociation Ss (N = 6)
Variable Mean SD Correlations
DISSO DISSO
r Partial r
ANG-OUT
r
df
Dissociation
index (DISSO) 3. 92 5 .84 - -
**
.
38*** 88
Anger-out 3. 32 1 .29
.
38***
- 88
Anger-i n 1. 39 1 .62 .09 .19* -
.
21 ** 88
Anxiety
• 92 1 .56 .20*
.16 .13 73
Physical change
i ndex 6. A 147 6 .50
**
.
46***
**
.
32**
**
.57*** 88
Visual imagery
of:
attacking other 75 1 .62 .13 .03 .26** 58
rejecting other 88 1 .77 .14 .02
*
.32** 73
being attacked 31 1 .01 58
being rejected 68 1 .41 .10 .16 -.12 73
being deprived 51 1 .19 -.15 -.22 .13 73
Impulse to
attack 2. 09 1 .63
**
.33** .20*
**
t
44*** 88
Attack, verbal
or behavioral 51 1 .36
**
.37***
**
.31**
.
24** 73
Replacement
emotion inten-
sity 1. 59 1 .58
**
t
40***
**
.
39***
.11 88
(continued on next page)
Table 4
(conti nued)
Between-Subjects Means & SD's & Grouped Intra-Subject
Correlations for Selected Variables:
Low Dissociation Ss (N = 7)
Vari able Mean SD Correlations
DISSO DISSO
r partial r
ANG-0UT
r
df
Di ssoci ati on
index (DISSO) 1.20 2.08 _ _
**
.28**
,
**
.
28** 103
Anger-out 3.26 1.13 m 103
Anger-i n
Anxiety
.72
.77
1.18
1.24
.06 .10
** **
.35*** .33***
-.14
.14
103
103
Physical change
i ndex 3.18 4.31
**
.30*** .20**
irk
t
45*** 103
Visual imagery
of:
attacking other .14 .66 43
rejecting other .42 1.16 - - 58
hpi nn at'+ ark pH
. C-\J
1
3
being rejected .35 1.00 73
being deprived .67 1.42 -.10 -.13 .09 58
Impulse to
attack 1.13 1.86
**
.28** .20**
**
.37*** 103
Attack, verbal
or behavioral .16 .80 58
Replacement
emotion inten-
sity 1.69 1.64 .01 .03 -.06 103
*p significant at the .05 level
**p significant at the .025 level
**p significant at the .01 level
**
**p significant at the .005 level
**
**p significant at the .0005 level
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reader will find descriptive data for the screening questionnaire in
Appendix B.
)
The High Dissociation group is significantly higher than the
Low Dissociation group on intensity of anger-in (t = 3.27, p <.005),
intensity of physical change (t = 4.20, p< .0005), intensity of im-
pulse to attack (t = 3.36, p < .005), and intensity of actual attack
(t = 2.13, p <.025). There were no significant differences between
group means on intensity of anxiety (t = .714, ns) and on intensity
of the replacement emotion (t = -.434, ns).
For High Dissociation subjects, correlations of the dissociation
index with other variables (after the effect of anger-out is removed)
show several consistencies with the results for all thirteen subjects.
These correlations also show some departures from the patterns for all
thirteen subjects. Dissociation is positively related to anger-out
(r = .38), to anger-in (r = .19), to physical change (r = .32), to
impulse to attack (r = .20), and to the intensity of the replacement
emotion (r = .39). Unlike the results for the whole group, dissocia-
tion does not show a significant relation with anxiety when the effect
of anger-out is removed. Consistent with the overall results, visual
imagery of attack still does not show a relation to dissociation. The
most interesting new results at this step are that anxiety no longer
shows a relation to dissociation (r = .39). The correlations of anger-
out with the other variables show the same pattern as the overall re-
sults.
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For Low Dissociation subjects, dissociation is related to anger-
out (r
- .28), to anxiety (r =
.33), to physical change (r - .20),
and to impulses to attack (r = .20). The correlation patterns for
anger-out among the Low Dissociation subjects is similar to the pat-
tern for the High Dissociation subjects.
In summary, the High Dissociation group is characterized by more
anger-in, more physical change or arousal, more intense impulse to
attack, and more intense actual attack than the Low Dissociation group.
The High and Low groups have in common significant correlations be-
tween dissociation and anger-out, physical change, and impulse to
attack. Only for the High Dissociation group is dissociation corre-
lated with anger-in, with intensity of attack, and with intensity of
the replacement emotion. Only for the Low Dissociation group is disso-
ciation correlated with anxiety.
The grouped phenomenol ogical picture of high dissociative anger-
out, then, includes high levels of physical change and impulses to at-
tack the other. Under conditions of high dissociation, these impulses
are more likely to be carried out into words or action. All other
things equal, the actual attack is more intense under high dissocia-
tion conditions. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, high dissocia-
tive anger-out is characterized by high levels of anger at oneself.
One possible explanation of this is that there is an internal conflict
between strong impulses and idealized schema within the self- theory
concerning acceptable behavior.
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Individual cases. Individual subjects for single case analyses were
selected to represent the High and Low Dissociation groups. The three
subjects with the highest and the three subjects with the lowest aver-
age dissociation scores were selected. Tables 5 through 10 present
each subject's means, standard deviations, and correlations. The cor-
relations between dissociation and the other variables (except the cor-
relation with anger-out) are all first-order partial correlations with
the effects of anger-out removed.
Further correlational analyses were conducted for each of these
selected individual cases. First, all the perceived stimuli responses
(items #53 - #67) and all the impulse to action responses (items #83 -
#97) were correlated with the dissociation index and with intensity of
anger-out for each subject. Next, dissociation and anger-out were cor-
related with reports of "self statements', re. statements to oneself
during the episode (items #74 - #80). Significant correlations found
by these methods are reported in each case discussion.
A more detailed look at these six individual cases serves to
"flesh out" the reported quantitative summaries. But there is a need
to present here something less than the complete protocol of each sub-
ject. The qualitative portion of each case presentation is therefore
organized around a consideration of the "part-selves", or social iden-
tities, involved in the individual subject's anger episodes.
Depersonalization and dissociation has been found to be more fre-
quent in adolescence than in adulthood. One explanation is that the
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development of the adolescent personality involves a temporary "mis-
matching" between part-selves or internal identities and the social
selves which are yet to be learned and integrated (Meares & Grose,
1978). From the perspective of cognitive self-theory, anger is arous-
ed in the present subjects when events are perceived by them as being
self-relevant. To the extent that dissociated aspects of these sub-
jects' self-theories become involved, they may be experiencing a
"mismatching" between their integrated selves and their dissociated
part-selves. A qualitative examination of their anger episodes, in
each case, reveals their current concerns for their identities, whether
they may be considered adolescents or not. The episodes of the High
Dissociation subjects, by this reasoning, show more events involving
non-integrated part-selves than do the episodes of the Low Dissociation
subjects
.
Subject Number 2, Joe, a High Dissociation Subject
Joe is a thirty-one year old divorced, white male who had been in
combat in Vietnam and who was, at the time of the study, a sophomore in
college with a C average. He is the third of four children and he
lives alone off campus with no dependents in his care. He is a re-
covered alcoholic. He stated that he sometimes considered himself an
angry person and that he sometimes had trouble with his anger. He
could not say what this trouble was when he was filling out the preli-
minary questionnaires, but he reported this trouble had been the focus
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of therapy in the past with positive results. At the time of the
study he was not in therapy. He stated that he frequently had the
experience of suddenly snapping into or out of some intense emotion-
al experience or state. He thought there was no single person who
considered him to be an angry person.
Joe ranked first out of all thirteen subjects on the average
dissociation rating for fifteen episodes. During the course of the
study, Joe frequently visited me in my office for help in filling out
the record and just to visit. He stated several times that he had dif-
ficulty participating but he persisted because he felt he was getting
something worthwhile out of it. Joe is a friendly person who had had
a vol i tile and difficult adult life. At the time of the study he was
involved with a Vietnam Veterans group and with Alcoholics Anonymous.
He completed fifteen episodes in two months.
Table 5 reports Joe's means, standard deviations, and correlations
for the index of dissociation and for anger-out with the variables of
interest. (Table 5 is on page 59.) As can be seen from Table 5,
dissociation shows no significant relation with anger-out although
the value of r (.41) is close to significance. Neither does dissocia-
tion show a relation to anxiety.
With the effects of anger-out removed, Joe's data show relations
between the experience of dissociation and anger-in (r = .68), physical
change (r = .79), impulses to attack (r = .55), and actual attack (r =
.66). Anger-out is correlated inversely with anger-in (r = .78),
Table 5
Means and SD's and Intra-Subject Correlations for
Selected Variables: Subject 2 (Joe, High DISSO)
(all df's = 13)
Variable Mean SD
DISSO
r
«ui i c lauuns
DISSO
partial r
ANG-0UT
y
1
Di ssociation
index (DISSO) 9.00 10.21
. H 1
Anger-out 3.07 2.34 .41
Anger- i n 1.87 2.39 .07
**
.68**
**
_ 7Q***
• / o
Anxiety 2.20 2.48 .08 .19 - 21
Physical change
** **
# 7g***index 10.47 10.59 .83*** 50*
Visual imagery
of:
attacking other 1
. 67 2.44 .14 .08 .17
rejecting other 3.00 2 54
. C J .05
. o 1
being attacked .33 1.29
being rejected .93 1.94 .36 .36 .11
being deprived .60 1.59 -.25
-.25
-.05
Impulse to
attack 3.13 2.23 .53**
.37 t 32***
Attack, verbal
or behavioral .60 1.59 .61*** .55**
.33
Replacement
emotion inten-
**
.66**sity 1.13 1.55 .46*
-.28
*p significant at the .05 level
**p significant at the .025 level
**p significant at the .01 level
*
**p significant at the .005 level
**
**p significant at the .0005 level
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and directly correlated with physical change (r =
.50), with visual
imagery of rejecting other (r = .51), and with impulses to attack
(r = .81). The additional correlational analyses revealed that
among perceived stimuli the perception of a threat to values was in-
versely related to dissociation #35, r = -.59, df = 13, p <.02, 2-
tailed). The perception of failing by his own standards was inverse-
ly related to anger-out (#26, r = -.81, P< .0005).
Joe's episode #8 has his highest value for the dissociation
index (30) and is also one of the episodes which has the highest score
for anger-out (5).
I was explaining to a friend on (sic) how to play
tennis. He was being an asshole fucking around. I
went bullshit. Flew into a rage. Yell and scream at
him Its in the feet, asshole, its in the feet. I was
told that I lost complete control of it all and it was
funny to other people.
Many of Joe's narratives have this sketchy quality. This may be
partly due to the fact that Joe would often re-experience his anger
while trying to write the narrative. It appears that Joe's friend
would not take his tennis lesson seriously and Joe flew into a rage.
What is noteworthy here is that Joe seems to have no actual memory of
what he did. He reports that it was other people who reported to him
that he lost complete control. This is certainly a face valid case
of dissociation. Joe stated that all measured aspects of dissocia-
tion were a part of his experience, and he marked every item compris-
ing the index its maximum value for intensity. His experience includes
feelings of depersonalization, self-alienation, unreality, lack of
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control, and impending disaster.
Joe perceived what he later called the inconsideration of his
friend as being himself blocked or frustrated from his goal. Per-
haps Joe's goal was to demonstrate his own skills, but this is con-
jecture. As his anger built, he experienced strong physical arousal
(on seven out of nine variables). He experienced imagery of reject-
ing his friend and impulses to attack him, to assert himself, and to
discharge tension. He carried out all these impulses in behavior.
The anger, which was mixed with anger at himself, lasted less than
thirty minutes during which time he was unaware of any self-state-
ments. In this case despite his correlation over all his episodes,
he experienced no replacement emotion.
In this episode there is little mediation between impulses and
behavior. Joe expressed his feelings and impulses directly and inten-
sely. The lack of control is so pronounced that he was unaware of its
full extent until later. As reported above, Joe also re-experienced
his anger when he wrote his narratives. Other episodes involved vivid
imagery of attacking another and he thought that these images and their
re-experience were similar to combat-related "flashbacks" which he had
experienced earlier in his life.
Three of Joe's "part-selves" or social identities: self as
recovered alcoholic, self as worker, and sexual self, are involved
in his anger episodes. Each of these identities is implicated in four
episodes apiece. Self as friend-to-others is involved in two more.
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The average dissociation level for the four anger episodes involv
ing self as worker is 17.5. The episode presented above in detail is
one of these. Joe is studying to teach physical education. His reac-
tion to his friend not taking the tennis lesson seriously is more un-
derstandable in this light. A similar episode, but one which involved
only anger at himself, involved umpiring an intra-mural Softball game.
This activity is required of students studying coaching. Joe had let
his mind wander during the game and consequently he made several bad
calls. He was verbally abused by the players and reprimanded by the
other umpire. Joe contained his reaction until he could vent his feel
ings later.
Four anger episodes concern incidents occurring at AA meetings.
The average dissociation rating is 8.75. In one incident, Joe got
extremely upset when he thought the anonymity of the meeting was being
violated by some visitors who were taking notes. Interestingly, Joe's
dissociation rating for this incident is 5, but he reported another
anger episode which wholly consisted in a vivid memory of the anony-
mity violation. In the first, the actual, episode he did not attack
the visitors as he had wanted; but in his memory episode he fantasized
attacking them.
In the two anger episodes involving self as friend-to others, he
was left behind by a change of friends' plans with no notice (DISSO =
15), and he lost a tape which he had borrowed from a friend (DISSO =
0). Finally, three incidents involved conflicting feelings about a
woman and one involved being the target of a homosexual pass. The
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average dissociation rating for these four episodes involving sexual
identity is 2.5.
Based on the average dissociation ratings for the anger episodes
clustered by "part-selves" or social identities, Joe is least inte-
grated in his sense of self as worker, followed by self as recovered
alcoholic, self as friend-to-others, and sexual self.
Joe's data match well the grouped data for the High Dissociation
Group. Joe's data show correlations between dissociation and anger-in,
physical change, actual attack, and the intensity of the replacement
emotion, as the grouped data do. Joe's correlation for dissociation
and anger-out is nearly significant. The only difference in Joe's
correlation pattern from the High Dissociation Group pattern is that
he does not show a correlation between dissociation and impulse to
attack
.
In reviewing this first case, it would seem that dissociation
can arise from several sources of conflict within Joe's self- theory.
First, Joe experiences anger at himself during some of these episodes.
Anger-in occurs together with anger-out only in one episode, however.
The rest of the anger-in episodes are "pure" anger-in with no anger-
out reported. Hence, there is a significant inverse relation between
anger-in and anger-out. Joe becomes angry at himself for doing "stu-
pid things", that is, things not in conformity with some image, per-
haps idealized, which he has of himself.
That Joe actually verbally attacks can be a second source of
conflict since this may conflict with his own considered views of how
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he should act. Finally, Joe's experience of di s confirmation in his
part-selves is another source of dissociation-producing conflict in
his self-theory. The conflict here is one between his ideal part-
self, for example "a competent coach and trainer," vs. his moment-
arily real, empirically-derived self: a poor tennis coach or a poor
umpi re
.
Subject Number 4, Glen, a High Dissociation Subject
Glen is a twenty-one year old, single, white male who at the time
of the study was a sophomore in college. He is the fourth of five
children and he lives on campus in a dormitory. He stated that he
sometimes considered himself an angry person and that he sometimes
had trouble with his anger. He wrote, "Depending on what is causing
the frustration I have trouble finding a suitable outlet." This trou-
ble had never been the focus of therapy, nor was he in therapy during
the study. He indicated that he never had the experience of suddenly
snapping into or out of an intense emotional experience or state. He
thought there was no single other person who considered him an angry
person
.
Glen ranked second on the average dissociation score for fifteen
episodes. When he was asked to participate in the study he expressed
some surprise since he didn't think he got angry enough. Glen was a
very cooperative subject, and his approach to participation was effi-
cient. He completed fifteen records in about five weeks. He did not
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a-
develop any more than a business relationship with me during those
five weeks.
Table 6 reports Glen's means, standard deviations, and correl
tions for the index of dissociation and for anger-out with the vari-
ables of interest. (Table 6 is on page 66.) As can be seen from
Table 6, dissociation is positively correlated with anger-out (r =
.64), and, when the effect of anger-out is removed, with the imagery
of rejecting the other (r
.54). Dissociation is inversely related
to imagery of being rejected (r =
-.66). For Glen, anger-out is re-
lated to physical change (r - .57), to imagery of attacking the other
(r = .72), to imagery of being rejected (r = .52), and to impulses to
attack (r = .42). Anger-out is inversely related to anxiety (r =
-.49).
The additional correlational analyses revealed that among im-
pulses, "to be noticed or acknowledged" was inversely related to dis-
sociation (#89, r = -.51, p <.05, 2-tailed). The following self-
statements were all positively related to dissociation: "If I don't
do something about this, I won't get what I need." (#74, r - .64,
p <.05). "I can't stand this person. He/she deserves to be punished
or put in his/her place." (#76, r = .66, p <.01). "If things con-
tinue this way, I won't get what I should get." (#79, r = .76,
p <.005). In addition, "I can't just sit here and take this." is
related to anger-out (#75, r = .70, p <.005).
Glen's episode #13 has his highest dissociation score (19) as well
as being one of three episodes which has the highest possible intensity
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Table 6
Means and SD's and Intra-Subject Correlations for
Selected Variables: Subject 4 (Glen, High DISSO)
(all df's = 13)
Variable Mean SD
Dissociation
index 5.00 4.91
Anger-out 3.73 .88
Anger-in 1.47 1.60
Anxiety
.27 .80
Physical change
index 6.07 5.54
Visual imagery
of:
attacking other 2.07 2.15
rejecting other 1.00 1.56
being attacked .40 1.12
being rejected 1.00 1.56
being deprived 1.33 1.40
Impulse to
attack 2.00 2.30
Attack, verbal
or behavioral 1.20 1.90
Replacement
emotion inten-
sity 2.73 1.53
Correlations
DISSO DISSO ANG-OUT
partial r r
54***
19 -.16
.59***
.36
.60***
.26
.62*** .54**
10
19
49*
14
20
-
.
66***
-.07
.32
-.14
0
_
54***
-.11
.57**
**
<
72***
.36
.52**
.37
.42*
0
.31
*p si gnificant at the .05 level
**p si gnificant at the .025 level
***p
*
**p
**
***p
si gnificant at the .01 level
si gnificant at the .005 level
si gnificant at the .0005 level
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rating for anger-out (5 )
.
This episode happened later in the afternoon of thPunch hour" episode. A truck had arrived wUh a fewthousand plants for us to unload and we were tired- butready, we had him back up to an area that wa alt set uo
stances. So, at first, I was very, very polite in ex-plaining to them that we could have the truck un oadedfor them much quicker if they'd stay clear. And, atfirst they were very obliging. But, there was this onelady who couldn't bother waiting and naturally, this
caused everyone else to move in. Well, this first lady
till c
ln T eh? W being in m^ way-no matter where Iwent S-o-o, I politely asked her to stay clear (1sttime) Two seconds later she cut me off and I almosttripped with an armload of plants. This time I toldher to stay clear. To no avail. As soon as I coUTd turn
around, there she was-in my way grabbing at her plants
I very sternly told her to get the hell out of there andproceeded to drop a box of plants at her feet so she qot
spattered with just a touch of mud. She didn't even
acknowledge this! I was just inches from exploding' Ihaven t come this close to literally wanting to punch
someone s lights out in a while. The only thing I could
do at this stage was to just stay clear of that lady
Just one more confrontation would have blown the top
well off this lid. Some people are so f-'ing obnoxious!
(The narrative ends with 68 exclamation points!)
Glen's perception of the customer's behavior was that she
was being inconsiderate. There is congruence between his perception
and his objective evaluation later. As he got angry, he experienced
physical change on eight of nine variables. He experienced visual
imagery of attacking and of rejecting the customer. All the self-
statements previously seen to be correlated over all his episodes
with dissociation and anger were in his awareness. In addition, so
were, "I'll show her. What she did was wrong!" and "I should be in
control here." Glen's single impulse was to attack the customer,
but he actually discharged tension and escaped the situation. He
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stayed angry at the customer for over three hours. His dissociative
experience involved every variable which makes up the dissociation
index
.
Glen's most frequent type of anger episode involves relations
with friends: Specifically, either friends not living up to Glen's
expectations of them (3 episodes), or a friend making too many de-
mands on his (2 epidoses). An example of the former involves Glen's
teasing a friend over beating him at pool several games in a row.
The friend hit Glen in the face and Glen restrained his own physical
attack on the friend in order to avoid an "all-out" fight. He later
decided to drop this person as a friend. In a case of inappropriate
expectations placed on Glen, an acquaintance of his from the dorm who
is from the same hometown as he habitually asked Glen to pick up or
deliver things when Glen planned to drive home from campus on week-
ends. The average dissociation level for these five episodes involv-
ing Glen's self as friend-to-others is 2.6.
Glen's sense of self as worker involved three anger episodes
which have an overall dissociation average of 9.3. The most expreme
episode was the one reported above as his most extreme dissociation
episode overall. The other two work episodes involved conflict with
a supervisor and conflict with a co-worker who attempted to usurp the
supervisor role over Glen.
Conflicts over his sense of self as good student occurred in
three other episodes which averaged 3.3 for level of dissociation.
These all involved conflicts between what he thought a good student
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should do vs. what Glen felt like doing at the time. For example,
one such episode involved a conflict between "partying" in his room
with friends vs. "being seen as an asshole" by asking them to leave
so he could study.
Two anger episodes involved conflict with authorities. In one
he quietly accepted a speeding ticket (DISSO = 3); in another he ar-
gued with his parents about moving off campus in the coming academic
year (DISSO = 5).
Judging by the average dissociation scores for these anger epi-
sodes grouped by "part-selves" or social identities, Glen experienced
least integration in himself as worker, followed by self as reponsible
adult, self as student, and self as friend-to others.
Glen's data do not readily support any simple explanation for
his dissociative experiences. His correlation pattern does not fol-
low the High Dissociation Group pattern well at all. In fact the
only correlation in common is that between dissociation and anger-
out. Glen's anger episodes, while they consist of standard anger-in-
ducing scenarios, do not seem to be as weighted toward self-relevant
phenomena as do those of Joe. After all Joe's identity as a recovered
alcoholic, for example, might be expected to be more self-theory rele-
vant than a college student's identity as a part-time general laborer
since for Glen laboring is only a temporary necessity.
Glen's data show correlations with dissociation that do not appear
for the High Dissociation Group. These correlations are in the visual
imagery variables. Glen also experiences several self-statements dur-
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ing dissociation. There is no comparison for the later with grouped
data, but Glen reported more self-statements (N = 46 for fifteen epi-
sodes) than all but one other subject (Thirteen Ss' range = 9 to 60).
Perhaps all these spontaneous visual images and self-statements in-
dicate some conflict, or at least confusion, in Glen's self-theory,
not otherwise measured. This idea was behind the original creation
of the visual imagery and self-statement items.
It may be that the occurrence of many different internal verbal
and visual events during a dissociative anger episode is yet another
symptom of dissociation itself, albeit a highly idiosyncratic one.
These occurrences may be symptomatic of some underlying conflict and
may represent the person's attempt to find interpretations of the
experience which will better fit the existing self-structure and hence
reduce dissociation. Alternately, they may be the epiphenomena of
elements in associational chains passing the threshold of conscious-
ness. On this later view, these internal events rarely may have a
significant bearing on the activation, playing-out, or resolution of
a dissociative anger episode. Of course, these two interpretations
may both be right, for they are not mutually exclusive. If so, the
explanations, taken as a whole, would help explain the highly idio-
syncratic nature of these internal phenomena. Speculation, based as
it is on a single case, must stop here.
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S u bject Number 1, Peter, a High Dissociation Subject
Peter is a twenty-one year old, single, white male who at the
time of the study was college junior with a A- average. He is the
second of four children. He lives off campus with some roommates in
an apartment. He indicated that he usually considered himself an an-
gry person and that he usually had trouble with his anger. He wrote,
"I often think that I don't think about what is making me angry enough
I find it difficult to talk to people who are either close or not so
close to my about my feelings. It is hard for me to talk to a thera-
pist about feelings of anger that I have (I have tried). I think I
sort of take my anger out against myself and I think that it is hard
for me to deal with past break-ups or family problems at this point
in my life." He indicated that this trouble had been the focus of
therapy in the past, but he could not describe the result. He was
not in therapy at the time of the study. He thought that there was at
least one other person who considered him an angry person.
Peter ranked third among all subjects on the average dissocia-
tion score for fifteen episodes. He is an intense person, much prone
to the sort of convoluted analysis suggested by the above quotation.
He had difficulty keeping appointments for this study. By his own
acknowledgement he had difficulty finishing all fifteen records. It
took him nearly three months.
Table 7 presents Peter's means, standard deviations, and corre-
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lations for dissociation and anger-out with the variables of interest,
(Table 7 is on page 73) As can be seen from Table 7, with the effect
of anger-out removed, dissociation is related to anger-in (r = .44)
and to anxiety (r = .44). Dissociation is inversely related to ima-
gery of being deprived (r =
-.62). Anger-out is related only to
anxiety (r = .80).
The additional correlational analyses revealed several relation-
ships. Perceived rejection was positively related to dissociation
(#28, r = .57, p .025). In addition, the self-statement (." should
be in control here." was positively related to dissociation (#80,
r = .73, p .005). Peter experiences dissociative anger-in when he
feels rejected, a set of experiences which would produce his appear-
ance of being tied up in knots in many people.
Several impulses showed a direct relation with intensity of
anger-out: "to seek help or understanding" (#87, r = .52, p< .025),
"to control, dominate, or exert influence" (#90, r = .58, p <.025),
and "to do nothing" (#97, r = .54, p < .025 ) . The impulse "to be in-
dependent" was inversely related to anger-out (#92, r = -.65,
p <.005). The alternation between dominating and doing nothing and
the inverse relation between anger at another and being independent
certainly confirm the picture of a young man tangled in his own con-
voluted self-system.
Peter's episode #1 has his highest rating for dissociation (11).
The anger-out rating for this episode was lower than that of three
Table 7
Means and SD's and Intra-Subject Correlations forSelected Variables: Subject 1 (Peter, Hiqh DISSO)
(all dfs = 13)
Variable Mean SD
U 1 OoU
r
oorre i ati ons
U1SS0
Partial r
ANG-01
p
Di ssoci ati on
index (DISSO) 4.07 3.17 _
.31
Anger-out 2.93 .79 .31 _
Anger-in 1.73 1.39 .39 .44*
-.08
Anxiety 1.60 1.18
.
50* 44*
. OU
Phvsiral rhannp
index 4.67 4. 95 24 14
. JO
Visual imaaprv
of:
attacking other .60 1.18 -.30 22
. JJ
i cjcui 1 fly ULilcr
. ou 1 . 1 b -
. 02 -.15
.37
being attacked .67 1.39 -.12
-.23
.29
being rejected 1.33 1.63 .27 .31 -.09
being deprived .47 .99
Impulse to
attack .27 .70
Attack, verbal
or behavioral 0 0 0 0 0
Replacement
emotion inten-
sity
.73 1.28. .29 .23 .26
**
*p significant at the .05 level
**p significant at the .025 level
**p significant at the .01 level
**
**p significant at the .005 level
**
**p significant at the .0005 level
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other episodes. This episode was rated "3" and there were three
others which were rated "4".
Last night my friend had called me and told me that
she wasn't able to do anything with me this Wednesday
night. We had had tentative plans to do something toge-
ther that night, and even though it turned out that I
had something to do that night anyway (something which
precluded my doing anything with her), I felt rejected
a little bit. As it turned out, she had a good friend
who was upset about something (her friend had just got
a new job, which was very difficult) and they were going
to get together to talk about it. Even though I knew at
that point that they did need time to talk about things,
I felt as if I was being set aside a little bit. My
friend started to tell me that she was a little bit upset
herself because she wasn't sure that she was able to help
her friend, and the situation was kind of ambiguous. This
only made me more angry, and I really didn't want to lis-
ten, so I kind of turned off, and just kind of said uh-huh
every couple of seconds in order to let her know I was
there. As it turned out, I felt like talking to her more
about it, but I didn't really do anything, and pretty much
just accepted the situation.
Peter experienced the prospect of not seeing his girlfriend
as rejection. Along with anger at her, he experienced anger at
himself and anxiety. He experienced physical change on all nine
variables. He had a visual image of being rejected. In addition
to "I should be in control here." he told himself, "If I con't
do something about this I won't get what I need. I can't just
sit here and take this. If things continue this way, I won't get
what I should get." His only impulse was to escape, and this is
what he did. His anger at the girl was replaced by anger at himself.
The episode lasted less than sixty minutes, and his dissociative
experience included all six items which comprise the dissociation in-
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dex
.
Peter's narratives are longer than any other subject's. He
analyzes his experiences in a very complicated way as a matter of
course. The impression is strengthened after meeting him. He
speaks in a slow manner, in a low voice, with numerous halts in mid-
sentence. The impression is of a person weighing every word. The
many self-statements reported in every episode seem to reflect this
same characteristic.
Three of Peter's anger episodes involved anger at another per-
son for expressing political or moral views different from his own.
The average dissociation rating for these three episodes is 5.3. In
one, he was putting a poster announcing some political activity on the
bulletin board at a bookstore and was told to remove it. In another
he could not help overhearing the opinions of a fellow student on the
need for nuclear arms. In the third episode, he observed a student
gleefully tear down a poster announcing a Gay/Lesbian dance event.
The incidents concerning his girlfriend are three involving
broken plans or nearly broken plans with her. The incident reported
above as Peter's most extreme dissociative incident is included
among these. A fourth involves anger at her and at himself for his
inability to respond to a minor concern of hers which she was exagger-
ating. He had wanted to be more sympathetic. The average dissocia-
tion rating for these four incidents with his girlfriend is 4.75.
Peter seems to be particularly conscious of sexism in his in-
teractions. He became angry at others for sexist attitudes and at
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himself for failing to live up to his own ideal in these matters.
All of the girlfriend episodes seem to reflect a strong ambivalence
about the relationship. In all but one of the episodes in this
category he seems to be working on his conscious and not so con-
scious beliefs about the relations between the sexes. The average
dissociation index across the six episodes involving his complex
attitudes and feelings about the sexes is 5.0.
Peter is a psychology major, and four anger episodes concern
some aspect of this "part-self." The average dissociation rating
for these episodes is 3.25. In one, he became angry at a* graduate
student for whom he was a subject in a cognition experiment. Peter's
concern about doing well was turned into anger at the experimenter for
not helping him do well (DISSO =9). In a second incident he became
angry at a small child at the day-care center where he was doing a
practicum. The child would not stop demanding attention by crying
and Peter felt unable to cope with the situation (DISSO = 3).
Judged by the average ratings of dissociation intensity for these
three clusters of Peter's anger episodes, it can be said that Peter
experiences the least integration with his political and moral beliefs,
followed by his sense of self as a boyfriend- and self as a psychology
student.
Peter's correlation pattern, like Glen's, also shows many depar-
tures from the pattern for the High Dissociation group. Of all the
variables which correlate with dissociation for the group, only anger-
in does so for Peter. In addition, while there is no group correla-
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tion between them. Based on what has been said about the role of
anger-in in Joe's case, Peter's dissociative experiences can be ex-
plained in somewhat the same fashion. The task is made easier by the
correlation of anxiety with dissociation, for this conforms with one
of the original hypotheses.
Peter has no episode of "pure" anger-in. Rather, anger-in
accompanies anger-out, although in no systematic pattern. Further-
more, Peter reports anger-in in thirteen of his fifteen episodes. It
seems clear that although Peter angers, he feels angry at himself for
it, and it makes him anxious. This internal conflict is relevant to
his idealized sense of self which is why he experiences dissociation.
Perhaps his readiness to perceive himself as being rejected by others,
is actually a projection of his own ideal -self rejection of his anger
at others.
Finally, in light of the discussion of the case of Glen, it should
be noted that Peter had the highest number of self-statements reported
over all episodes (N = 60). Even though only one self-statement shows
a systematic relation to dissociation, this wealth of "random" internal
events should be seen as an index of confusion about "who" is temporar-
ily in control of Peter's anger: angry Peter, moral Peter, or some
other set of central postulates.
Before presenting the case discussions of the three Low Disso-
ciation subjects, a brief summary is in order. The three High Disso-
ciation subjects, Joe, Glen, and Peter, were selected only on the
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basis of their dissociation scores. What is interesting is that
the three cases present a range of ways of experiencing dissociative
anger. Joe's impulsiveness contrasts sharply with Peter's introspec-
tion. Glen's anger seems somewhere between these two. At the two
extremes of these cases, Joe and Peter, dissociation is more strong-
ly related to anger-in than it is to anger-out. Glen's data show the
relationships originally hypothesized: dissociation is positively
correlated with anger-out and is not significantly related with anger-
in. Glen is also more reliably aware of both visual images and self-
statements that either Joe or Peter.. Only for Peter is anxiety posi-
tively related to anger. Glen actually reports an inverse relation
between anger-out and anxiety. The idiosyncratic departures from the
general trends in the data are striking.
Subject Number 10, Marcia, a Low Dissociation Subject
Marcia is a twenty-one year old white, single female who at
the time of the study was a college junior with an A- average. She
is the oldest of three children and she lives off campus in an apart-
ment with several others. She indicated that she did not consider
herself an angry person and that she had no trouble with anger.
She had never been in therapy. She indicated that she occasionally
had the experience of suddenly snapping into or out of some intense
emotional experience or state. No one she knew considered her an
angry person.
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Marcia ranked eleventh out of thirteen subjects on the average
dissociation rating across fifteen episodes. She is a good student,
works part-time, and is active in campus activities. Her approach
to the study was matter-of-fact. She took about five weeks to com-
plete fifteen records.
Table 8 presents Marcia's means, standard deviations, and corre-
lations for dissociation and anger-out with the variables of interest.
(Table 8 is on page 80.) As can be seen from Table 8 with the effect
of anger-out removed, dissociation is related only to anxiety (r =
.57). Anger-out is related to imagery of rejecting the other (r =
.61) and to impulses to attack (r - .68).
The additional correlational analyses reveal that the perception
of being attacked, deceived, or exploited is directly related to dis-
sociation (#57, r = .58, p < .025 ) as is the impulse to escape (#85,
r = .49, p <.05). Marcia's episode #15 is among those episodes in
which she experienced no dissociation, and the rating for anger-out
intensity was the highest one for her (5).
I got home from classes after a long day and went to
get a glass of ice tea. I looked up in the cabinet and
there were no clean glasses. I looked in the sink and it
was full. My roommate and I hadn't eaten at the apartment
for a few days. The other two apartment mates were too
lazy to load the dishwasher and turn it on and knew we'd
do it if they didn't. I got mad and frustrated. I wanted
to scream but I talked to my roommate about it.
Although Marcia objectively viewed her apartment mates' behavior
as inconsideration, at the time she perceived it as an attack. Accom-
panying very strong anger at them was a little anger at herself. All
Table 8
Means and SD's and Intra-Subject Correlations forSelected Variables: Subject 10 (Marcia, Low DISSO)
(all df s = 13)
Variable Mean
Di ssociation
index (DISSO) 1.40
Anger-out 3.60
Anger- in
.80
Anxiety
.67
Physical change
index 2.60
Visual imagery
of:
SD Correlations
DISSO DISSO ANG-OUT
r Partial r r
2.61
.91
1.08
1.40
3.09
05
03
55**
-.15
Impulse to
attack
.93 1.70
Attack, verbal
or behavioral 0 0
Replacement
emotion inten-
sity 2.60 2.26
10
02
57**
-.15
-.13
.18
0
-.14
-.05
-.16
-.34
-.07
attacking other 0 0 0 0 0
rejecting other 1.53 2.23 .08 .14
.61
being attacked 0 0 0 0 0
being rejected 1.13 1.88 -.08
-.09
-.22
being deprived 2.87 2.03 -.39
-.41
.43
**
68**
-.22
*p significant at the .05 level
**p significant at the .025 level
***
*
**
**
p significant at the .01 level
p significant at the .005 level
p significant at the .0005 level
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she noticed physically was a slight increase in muscle tension. She
experienced visual imagery of rejecting the others and of being de-
prived herself. She was aware of saying to herself, "If I don't do
something about this, I won't get what I need. I can't just sit here
and take this. I can't stand this person. She deserves to be pun-
ished or put in her place." Her only impulse was to attack, but in-
stead she talked about the experience with a sympathetic roommate
who was in the same situation as she. The episode lasted less than
one minute.
Marcia appears to be level-headed and in control, but not over-
controlled. Much of her perceived experience involves others being
inconsiderate of her, making dependent demands on her, or trying to
control her. She frequently has impulses to attack, to discharge ten-
sion, or to counter-control. These impulses are nearly always con-
verted into actions such as communicating, understanding, complying,
and asserting. The conversion of impulses to attack and to discharge
tension into understanding and communication could represent some over-
control of her impulses. Marcia, however, is also able to assert her-
self when she thinks it is necessary.
Six of Marcia's anger episodes involve relations with friends.
The average dissociation rating for the six episodes is 2.83. In
most of these episodes Marcia experienced a conflict between her view
of what friends should do for or demand of each other, and what was
actually taking place. Marcia sees herself as a loyal friend but
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feels her loyalty is often unappreciated by her friends. She would
like more consideration from them since she often goes out of her
way for them herself.
During the course of the study, Marcia had a lot of "roommate
trouble." In all, five of her anger episodes involve the kind of
incident described in detail above. Only one of these was rated
above zero for dissociation intensity (DISSO =4). In this single
dissociative incident, one of Marcia's roommates refused to state her
intention to move out until a friend of Marcia's who wanted to move in
had to find other living arrangements. In a way, this incident might
be classified as a "friendship" episode rather than as a "roommate"
episode; but the evidence is equivocal.
The remaining anger episodes involved no dissociation. Two
concerned work, one involved a disagreement with her father over her
ability to choose a car to buy with her own money, and one involved
angry disappointment with her boyfriend for going home for two weekends
in a row. From the average dissociation ratings for these clusters
of anger episodes it would seem that Marcia was attempting to achieve
better integration of her self as friend-to-others. Other "part-selves"
or social identities seem to be comparatively well integrated.
Subject Number 12, Steven, a Low Dissociation Subject
Steven is a thirty year old, single, white male who at the time
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of the study lived alone in a studio loft near a large university
campus. Steven is the second of three children. He is a struggling
painter and at the time of the study he was trying to decide about
his future career. He has lived marginally economically for many
years, sacrificing much to his artistic development.
Steven indicated that he sometimes considers himself an angry
person and that he sometimes has trouble with his anger. He wrote,
"I have trouble with anger when the situation involving my anger
does not move towards some satisfactory resolution in a reasonable
period of time." This trouble had been the focus of therapy in the
past with positive results. He was not in therapy at the time of the
study. He reported occasionally having the experience of suddenly
snapping into or out of some intense emotional experience or state.
He thought that there was at least one other person who considered
him an angry person.
Steven ranked twelfth out of thirteen subjects on the average rat-
ing of dissociation for fifteen episodes. Steven is an intense and
serious person who is taken by some as too egocentric. I have known
Steven for many years, and I expected his data to show intense anger.
Instead, I was surprised to learn this his mean anger-out rating was
below the overall group mean. Steven took two months to complete
fifteen records.
Table 9 reports Steven's means, standard deviations, and corre-
lations for dissociation and for anger-out with the variables of
interest. (Table 9 is on page 84.) As can be seen from Table 9,
Table 9
Means and SD's and Intra-Subject Correlations forSelected Variables: Subject 12 (Steven, Low DISSO)
(all df's = 3)
Variable Mean SD Correlations
DISSO DISSO
sity
ANG-OUT
r partial r r
i
Dissociation
index (DISSO) 1.00 1 .65 - -
.26
Anger-out 3.07 .59 .26
Anger-in
.93 1.03 -.17
-.25
.24
Anxiety
. 93 1 .22 09 m
. oU
Physical chanap
index 3.67 3.81 .25 .10 71'
v i oua i llllaycry
of:
attacking other 0 0 0 0 0
rejecting other 0 0 0 0 0
being attacked 0 0 0 0 0
being rejected 0 0 0 0 0
being deprived 0 0 0 0 0
Impulse to
attack .80 1.74
** **
.
86***
.36
Attack, verbal
or behavioral 0 0 0 0 0
Replacement
emotion inter- .93 1.03 -.25 -.20 -.23
**
*p significant at the .05 level
**p significant at the .025 level
***p significant at the .01 level
**
**p significant at the .005 level
**
***p significant at the .0005 level
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with the effect of anger-out removed, only "impulses to attack" is
related to dissociaton (r = .86) and only physical change is related
to anger-out (r = .71 )
.
The additional correlational analyses revealed one self-state-
ment to be related to dissociation, "I can't stand this person.
He/she deserves to be punished or put in his/her place." (#76,
r = .70, p <.005). The perception of being attacked, deceived, or
exploited (#57, r = .46, p < .05) and the perception of threat to
values (#62, r = .44, p< .05) were both related to intensity of
anger-out. Finally, the impulse to assert was related to anger-out
(#83, r - .53, p< .025).
Steven's episode #10 is one out of thirteen episodes for which
the dissociation index was rated "0". Episode #10 is also rated "4"
for intensity of anger-out, the highest rating given for any of
Steven's episodes. There were two other episodes rated four.
I have told C. that I would try to meet with her
in (a city about 30 miles away). I am unable to get a
hold of her by phone so I do not stop over. Once home
I call and she is anqry that I am inconsiderate and that
my business with L. (another woman) is more important to
me than she is. I am quite angry and agitated by this.
That evening when she has returned to her apartment I
confront her. I am shaken and disturbed. I tell her that
my other commitments are of primary importance to me.
And that if she cannot accept it then I cannot see her.
We have a reconciliation, but I remain distrustful as
I sense she is of me.
Steven saw the woman's behavior objectively as controlling.
His perception of it is extremely mul ti faceted . He sees the situa-
tion primarily as being attacked, but also as being rejected, being
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controlled, as being a threat to his values, as disapproval, as
a loss of the relationship, and as a dependent demand. (One can
only speculate about the degree of retrospective "filling in" in-
volved in this list.) His anger at the woman was accompanied by
anger at himself and by anxiety. He experienced physical change
on five out of nine variables. He was aware of the self-statement,
"I'll show her. What she did was wrong. I should be in control
here." His impulses were as complex as his perceptions: to defend
his identity was the strongest one. But he also wanted to communi-
cate, to control events, to assert himself, and to understand. He
reported that he did all these things as well. His anger lasted more
than three hours.
The pattern of reporting multiple facets of a perceived situa-
tion is present in every one of Steven's anger records. Likewise,
also present are the patterns of multiple impulses and complicated
behavioral responses. The perceived stimulus/impulse patterns indi-
cate a subtle intuitive awareness of the complexity of relationships.
While Steven was capable of putting these intuitive experiences into
the format of the anger records, he complained that the record was
only a rough approximation of his experience. It is interesting to
note that Steven recorded no spontaneous visual imagery in any of his
episodes, yet he is an artist. His presentation of the episodes shows
him to be a complicated conceptual izer of his experience. His work
reflects this, too. My own untutored impression of his art is that
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it is highly conceptual and the visual dimension is extremely con-
trolled
.
Six of Steven's anger episodes involve his sense of self as
an artist. The average dissociation rating for these episodes is
1.83. Steven supports himself working part-time as a store clerk
and picking up odd remodeling and carpentry jobs. At the time of
the study he was having financial difficulties and was anxiously
waiting to hear about a possible job in a more artistic realm which
a friend had tried to get him. Three incidents involved dealing
with obnoxious customers in his part-time service job. The average
dissociation rating for these three incidents is 3.66. The three
other incidents involved anger, frustration, and disappointment about
the artistic job which fell through. The average rating for these
three episodes is .66.
Steven spent a weekend with the father of a very close woman
friend. The father was dying and Steven was visiting in order to
give some relief to his friend who had been caring for her father for
several months. Steven reported three anger episodes during this week-
end. The immediate stimulus for his anger was feeling that too many
demands were being placed on him. The average dissociation rating for
these three episodes is .66.
Steven had two anger episodes involving difficulties with his
roommate. One episode was rated 0 and the other was rated 2. The
later episode reveals Steven to be a very expressive and sensitive
person. He begins by confronting the roommate and the roommate is
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obviously moved by the threat of losing the relationship. Steven
sees this, realizes that the dirty dishes, etc. are irrelevant to
their relationship of otherwise mutual support, and he begins to
weep. The episode ends with Steven and his roommate quietly dis-
cussing their difficulties over tea.
Steven's remaining anger episodes were all rated zero for dis-
sociation. Two involved disagreement about the terms of the rela-
tionship with a current girlfriend, one involved a phone call from
his brother from whom Steven rarely hears, and one was what must be
called "just a bad day." In this last one, Steven's attempts to con-
duct errands brings him into unaccountable minor difficulties with
acquaintances and strangers. Judged by the average dissociation
rating of these clusters of anger episodes, Steven has most difficul-
ty integrating his identity as a menial worker when he sees himself
as a working artist. This is probably somewhat functional since he
maintains his own self-esteem by thinking of these jobs as temporary
and in service of his survival as an artist.
On the other hand, in spite of his disappointment with not
getting a desirable job, he had comparatively little trouble inte-
grating the experience. He has a very strong, clear, and integrated
sense of himself as an artist. The difficulties with his roommate
and the troubling weekend with the dying may show that Steven is a
perceptive and caring individual who is little troubled by conflict-
ing senses of himself.
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Subject Number 8, Dave, A Low Dissociation Subject
Dave is a twenty-two year old, single white, male who at the time
of the study was a college junior with an A average. He is the first
of six children and he lives in a dormitory on campus. Dave did not
consider himself an angry person, nor did he think he had any trouble
with anger. He had never been in therapy. He never had the experi-
ence of suddenly snapping into or out of an intense emotional experi-
ence or state. He could not think of any other person who thought he
was an angry person.
Dave ranked last out of all subjects on the average dissociation
rating for fifteen episodes. Dave is a friendly and hard working per-
son who was puzzled at first by the study. He was finally able to un-
derstand the purpose of the protocol after several instruction ses-
sions. I do not attribute this difficulty to a lack of intelligence,
but rather to a low level of psychol ogical -mindedness . Dave was al-
ways prompt for appointments and he completed fifteen anger records in
less than a month.
Table 10 presents Dave's means, standard deviations, and correla-
tions for dissociation and for anger-out with selected variables.
(Table 10 is on page 90.) As can be seen from Table 10 with the
effect of anger-out removed, dissociation is related to anxiety (r =
.71). Anger-out is related to actual verbal or behavioral attack
(r = .44).
The additional correlational analyses revealed a strong relation
Table 10
Means and SD's and Intra-Subject Correlations for
Selected Variables: Subject 8 (Dave, Low DISSO)
(all df's = 13)
Variable
Dissociation
index (DISSO)
Anger-out
Anger- i n
Ansiety
Physical change
index
Visual imagery
of:
attacking other
rejecting other
being attacked
being rejected
being deprived
Impulse to
attack
Attack, verbal
or behavioral
Replacement
emotion inten-
sity
Mean
.33
3.07
.87
1.87
.13
.47
0
.20
.06
1.53
.33
SD Correlations
DISSO DISSO ANG-OUT
• r partial r r
1.05
1.22
1.36
1.60
73 1.16
.26
-.02
70**
49*
.52
.99
0 0
.56
.26
1.81 .31
1.29 -.09
-.05
**
71**
43
1.27 1.43 -.11
.23
.13
-.16
.26
.09
.08
.42
.40
.44*
.15
*p signiticant at the .05 level
**p significant at the .025 level
***p significant at the .01 level
**
**p significant at the .005 level
**
***p significant at the .0005 level
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between dissociation and perceived threat to values (#62, r = .95,
p <.0005) and between dissociation and the self-statement, "I can't
just sit here and take this," (#75, r = .60, p< .01). Dave's epi-
sode #10 is one among thirteen episodes which have a rating of "0"
for the dissociation index. Dave's episode #10 also is an episode
in which anger-out is rated highest (5).
I went to put up my shade in the morning to let the
sunlight in. I gave the shade several quick tugs, trying
to get it to snap up and roll up. Each tug was increas-
ingly harder and the shade each time would not roll up,
but would roll down further. Finally I tugged so hard out
of anger that the shade ripped off the roll and both came
flying to the floor. I instantly swore out loud and picked
up the shade and threw it to the floor again. I left it
there for five minutes while I continued to dress for
school. Meanwhile, I forgot about it for a few minutes-
then I repaired the shade and replaced in it the window
frame
.
Dave interpreted the shade's malfunction as being controlled
by the shade. His anger included anger at himself. As for physi-
cal changes, he was only aware of moderately increased muscle ten-
sion. He was aware of the self-statement, "I should be in control
here." He had impulses to attack and to control the situation. He
attacked the shade while angry, the episode lasting less than a min-
ute. His anger was replaced by a moderate feeling of guilt.
Overall, Dave's episodes show him frequently getting angry
over problems within organized activities of which he is a part in
the dormitory and on campus. He tends to interpret these predictable
problems or organizations as inconsideration and attempts to control
him by others. His impulses tend to be to assert himself and to
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counter-control, but he actually talks things through, seeks help
from others, or does nothing. It might be said that in these cir-
cumstances, he has little outlet for his anger and so he seizes on
an opportunity to destroy an object in the shade episode.
Five of Dave's anger episodes involve some frustration (often
an important meeting being cancelled) over his activities in dorm
governance and the Resident Assistant Program. His narratives
show him to be an energetic organizer of dorm activities, but with
little power. Three anger episodes involve social plans with friends
being arbitrarily cancelled at the last minute by them. Two of these
episodes are the only ones out of his fifteen episodes in which he
reports some dissociative experience. Two anger episodes each in-
volve taking exams, impulses to destroy malfunctioning inanimate ob-
jects (the shade incident is one), and frustration over his thwarted
supervision of workers. One anger episode involved being stood up
by his girl friend.
Judging from the dissociation ratings of the incidents involv-
ing friends, Dave has most difficulty integrating these experiences
into his own self-theory. It is interesting to note that in eleven
of his episodes Dave reports that he felt like speaking his mind to
the target of his anger, but instead he does nothing to the target,
thinks about the incident or talks it over with uninvolved friend.
Overall, Marcia, Steven, and Dave are the three Low Dissociation
subjects and their data reflect this. Among these three there are
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no correlations between dissociation and anger, either anger-out or
anger-in. faret a and Dave show anxiety to be related to dissocia-
tion, but Steven does not. Steven shows a relation between physical
change and anger-out and Marcia and Dave do not. It is more diffi-
cult to identify contrasts and similarities among the three Low Disso-
ciation subjects. Marcia, Steven, and Dave's data are less detailed
than Joe, Glen, and Peter's.
As a final point in this Results Chapter, no attempts was made to
assess gender differences in dissociative anger patterns. This is true
first because there were no a priori differences conceived along gender
lines. Second, the N's were, in the end, quite small. There were 4
males and 2 females in the High Dissociation group and 3 males and 4
females in the Low Dissociation group. This difference is not signi-
ficant by chi square analysis ( x = .733, df = 1 , ns).
CHAPTER III
CONCLUSION
It was argued in Chapter I that the presence of dissociated
structures in the self-theory complements the operation of the uni-
ty principle, rather than simply contradicts it. For while the ten-
dency toward unity or integration of the sense of self is primary,
as all self theorists agree, the tendency toward integration cannot
be allowed to override the other functions of the self. Maintaining
a favorable pleasure/pain balance and maintaining a tolerable self-
esteem level will at times be more important than integrating all
experience into a unified theory of sel f-and-worl d . Furthermore,
the process of integration itself may depend in part on a gradual,
rather than a sudden and potentially overwhelming, exposure to self-
significant material. For most people, the world does not fully
cooperate in exposing them to traumatic events gradually. For most
of us there are times when the world is a "world according to Garp"
(Irving, 1978) filled with events which, willy-nilly, we must either
integrate or be destroyed by. The process of dissociation allows us
to time our own exposure to these events as we try to integrate them
after they occur.
From this perspective, the functions of emotion in the overall
self-theory can be conceptually expanded. It has already been pointed
out that emotion temporarily creates a paradigm by which the world and
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the self are viewed and experienced (p. 17). An emotion creates for
the person a state of readiness to perceive, to process, and to res-
pond in particular ways. An emotion eliminates many possible inter-
pretive and behavioral responses and makes a certain few accessible
and more likely to occur. As such, an emotion circumvents some of
the usual integrating processes of the person. The result is that
emotional action is more direct, automatic, and efficient in terms of
the limited goals involved (e_g_. attack, avoid, approach, recoup).
In light of the complementary relation dissociation has with
the integrating tendencies of the self-theory, something more can be
said about the significance of emotion to the self-theory. We react
emotionally to events which are not immediately integratable into our
overall self-theories. Emotional reactions ensure that the data of
a traumatic, j_e. a self-significant, experience are dissociated long
enough for the work of gradual exposure and integration to occur after
the events. The mechanisms by which this occurs can be assumed to be
those described in Bower's associative network theory (pp. g-12).
In short, besides their focusing and action-orienting functions, emo-
tions also serve as a protection against the too rapid integration of
traumatic data into the overall sense of self. Subsequently, emotional
experience provides one means by which later integrative work can
occur
.
It may be that the work of integrating self-relevant material
after an emotion-based dissociation of that material is usually a
pre-conscious activity and only becomes apparent under special circum-
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stances. An examination of the phenomenon of "parallel process"
in psychotherapy supervision perhaps can shed some light on this.
Parallel process refers to perceptual and cognitive distortions of
the supervisory relationship. There can be numerous sources for these
distortions, but when the distortions result from unprocessed emo-
tion-based reactions of the therapist to the psychotherapy client and
his/her material, this is called parallel process. A joi nt exami na-
tion by supervisor and training therapist of these distortions can
lead to a fuller understanding of the psychotherapy client and of the
interaction between the therapist and the client. To some extent,
this examination can also lead to the therapist's integration of pre-
viously dissociated self-relevant material.
What might occur is something like this: Initially the therapist
experiences an emotional reaction to somethi ng the client does or says,
perhaps anger at the client's being twenty minutes late for the meet-
ing. The therapist, wanting to follow a reliable rule-of-thumb for
the opening minutes of any therapy session, is aware of the angry
feelings but says nothing about it and waits for the client to begin.
The meeting proceeds and the therapist "forgets" the client's lateness
and the angry feelings. Later, in supervision, the supervisor an-
swers a phone call while meeting with the therapist. The therapist
becomes angry at this and expresses it to the supervisor. A discus-
sion of the problem ensues between them and the incident is eventually
linked to the client's lateness. This insight aids in a retrospective
reinterpretation of the therapy hour under discussion. Perhaps the
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discussion extends to cover aspects of the training therapist's own
developing sense of self as a therapist which may be implicated.
This example suggests several features of emotions as facila-
tators of later integration. First, that the therapist got angry is
a sign that he/she perceived the events as self-relevant. Second,
these events were not ignored but associated to the anger-complex and
forgotten or dissociated. This dissociation occurred in part because
the therapist experienced a conflict between impulses: to express
anger ( = bad therapist?) v_s. to wait for the client to begin and to
carry the session ( = good therapist?). Third, feelings of anger are
evoked by the supervisor's behavior which acts as a cue. That this
anger is expressed is to the advantage of all: supervisor, therapist,
and client. It allows for a more informed understanding of the pre-
vious therapy hour and perhaps provides an opportunity for the train-
ing therapist to continue his/her own itergration of the self-as-
therapist
.
Psychotherapy supervision is, of course, a special set of circum-
stances. But whenever people reflect upon their emotional reactions
to others retrospectively, they may be doing a form of this integrative
work. Whether someone takes advantage of this associational organiz-
ing function of emotions is a matter of individual difference which
even within individuals will vary with timing and circumstances. If
this were not the case, training therapists would have no need for
supervision. Indeed, people in general might have less need for
therapists.
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The positive contribution that the process of dissociation makes
to the integrative work of the self-theory must be reconciled with the
clinical observation that dissociation is a dysfunctional state of
affairs. Simply stated, dysfunctional dissociation is complementary
dissociation gone awry. For some reason or reasons, the gradual
re-exposure to self-significant traumatic data does not occur. In-
stead, the traumatic data remain unintegratable, the self-theory re-
mains unintegrating, and the emotion sub-hierarchy remains proble-
matically dissociated.
Without going into great speculative detail, it seems reasonable
to hypothesize that anxiety is significant in the development of
dysfunctional dissociation. The complementary function of dissocia-
tion breaks down when there is associated with the traumatic data too
much anxiety for the person to withstand. This, again, may be a func-
tion of the overall integrative capacity of the hierarchically superi-
or self-theory, or of the details of the traumatic data, or of addi tion-
al associations to the particular emotion-node involved. Likely, it
is a combination of these.
What is known about child abusing parents supports this view.
As was previously described (pp. 24-25 )» the typical child abuser
was him or herself abused as a child. This abuse, occurring as it
does in the early stages of self-theory development, results in a fra-
gile and fragmented overall self-theory incable of integrating the
traumatic experiences of childhood. These memories then remain dis-
sociated, not repressed in a dynamic unconscious, but connected to the
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emotional sub-hierarchies of anger, anxiety, and perhaps sadness.
When these emotions are invoked the abuser quickly becomes over-
whelmed by them and the parent repeats the behavior of his/her own
parent when the "good parent-bad child" configuration is reasserted.
Thus first-time abuse initiated a vicious circle of increased disso-
ciation, increased vulnerability to trauma, and increased probabi-
lity of further abuse.
There is growing evidence that multiple personality is a disorder
regularly associated with early childhood abuse of the most intrusive
and self-violating kind (Saltman & Solomon, 1 982). The abused child
excapes his or her pain and anxiety by an extreme dissociation which
results in the capacity to develop multiple selves. Most later selves
are usually segregated by a complete lack of co-consciousness. This
is a fascinating topic of research which has long been dormant and is
only recently attracting serious study (Rosenbaum, 1 980; Carlson, 1981).
In the present context, what is most relevant about multiple persona-
lity disorder is the role emotion plays in its development.
The personalities that so-called "multiples" develop earliest
are usually the most complex and mul ti faceted . But usually the per-
sonalities are characterized by one dominant emotion (Lester, 1977;
Howland, 1983). Anger may be the domain of an aggressive, assertive
male personality, (regardless of the biological sex or social gender
of the person). Sexual desire is felt only in the personality of
a femme fatal
e
or a Don Juan. Sadness may only be experienced as a
young child (who also often knows most about the others). Anxiety
may take form only in a "crazy person," the one who gets
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hospital ized.
It seems, then that these facts are consistent with an associa-
tive network model of the relation between emotion and the overall
self-theory. In the case of the child abuser, the hierarchically
superior self-theory is fragmented and unstable. The dissociated
traumatic data of experience are associated with several disburbing
emotion clusters. In the case of the multiple personality, extreme
dissociation (of such strength as to anesthetize the child from physi-
cal pain) has occurred so early that it has itself become a paradigm
for the further growth of the self. The emotions offer a naturally-
occurring structure for this further development.
The present study
. The present study sought evidence for dissocia-
tive experience in anger. On the whole, this evidence was found, and
it was found among a group of people with no history of severe psy-
chopathy. This counts for support of the general propositions that
dissociation is within the normal range of human experience and that
it is a phenomenon which is related to certain emotional experiences.
The seven hypotheses tested were developed out of a consideration
of and speculation about the structural arrangements of dissociative
anger within the self- theory. How did these fare?
With data pooled over all subjects, dissociative experiences
were shown to be directly related to anger at another. With the effect
of anger-out partialed out, dissociative experiences were shown to be
directly related to anger at self, to anxiety, to awareness of a vari-
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ety of physical changes, to impulses to attack someone, and to the
intensity of the emotion which replaced anger. With data pooled over
the High Dissociation subjects, actual verbal or behavioral attack
was also shown to be related to dissociative experiences. In general,
six out of seven hypotheses were confirmed.
The experience of dissociation of anger includes feelings of
approaching an impending disaster and of reaching a point of no re-
turn. In addition, the feelings of being "on automatic" and of being
detached and observing give this potentially disastrous situation a
depersonalized tone. This depersonalization continues into immediate
retrospective reflection with feelings of unreality for the events and
feelings that the angry person was somehow "not me." More intense
experiences such as these are experienced along with more intense an-
ger, more disinhibition to attack, more anxiety, more felt physical
changes, and more intense subsequent emotions. These relations are
independent of any relations there might be between anger and the other
variables. It therefore can be concluded that dissociative anger is
a real phenomenon.
Experience of dissociation in anger is an index of the degree
of non-integration in the self-theory. Specifically, dissociative
experience in anger is an indicator that associated to the anger
emotion node are self-relevant traumatic data which are too incom-
patible with the overall self-theory to be assimilated. It could al-
so mean that, temporarily at least, the overall self-theory is too
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fragile or fragmented to accomplish the work of integration. Finally,
dissociative anger could mean that the anxiety attendant upon integra-
tion of traumatic anger-related material is unbearable. Of course
there may be degrees of each of these possible conditions in combina-
tion with each other. The report of dissociative experience in anger
in itself does not suggest any one of these possible conditions.
On a most general level, what can be said about the nature of
dissociation? Succintly, dissociation is the result of conflicts
within the self-theory. There can be a conflict between impulses to
express an emotion and internalized prohibitions against that expres-
sion. There can be a conflict between the empirically-derived, imme-
diate, sense of self and an idealized version of self. Finally, there
can be a conflict based on the need to interpret events and to act
and a lack of adequate conceptual and behavioral schema to do so.
It remains for future research to develop means of identifying
the qualities of dissociated self-theory. But this future task should
be guided by the notion that dissociation has normal functions. It
therefore seems a useful strategy to compare dissociative emotional
phenomena between normal and disturbed individuals in order to know
more about normal dissociation. Normal and dysfunctional dissocia-
tion can be thought of as differing in degree. The reasons for dif-
fering degrees of dissociation are complicated, however. They include
the nature of the material dissociated, the extensiveness of the over-
all self-theory, the degree of threat to self-esteem which integration
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would involve, and the degree of anxiety resulting from disorganiza-
tion in the self-theory. This research should certainly also be ex-
panded to a study of other emotions besides anger. Intense sexual
desire, extreme sadness, joy, and fear are some which imeediately
come to mind. Epstein's methodology lends itself to this extension,
although a clinical population would of necessity be dealt with dif-
ferently from the present methods.
Unexpected findings and difficulties
. The formulation of Hypothesis
One, in retrospect, now seems unnecessarily narrow. As the data
showed, both intensity of anger-out and intensity of anger-in are
directly related to the intensity of dissociative experience. Con-
sistent with the hypothesis as formulated, however, anger-out shows
a stronger relation with dissociation than does anger-in. It was also
found that dissociation is a better predictor of anger-in than is
anger-out.
The reasoning behind only predicting a relation between dissoci-
ation and anger-out was based on the idea that anxiety plays a signi-
ficant role in the dissociation of anger. It was supposed that the
source of this anxiety is social learning about the inappropriateness
of expressing anger. This led to the expectation that the expression
of anger (anger-out) is more likely to be a dissociative phenomenon
than the feeling of anger at oneself. There was also a practical con-
sideration. There simply was no basis on which to predict the fre-
quency of anger at oneself, nor was it as easy as anger at another to
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operational ize.
The discovery of a positive correlation between the dissociation
index and intensity of anger-in is therefore not perplexing. Nor does
this finding invalidate the theoretical positions advanced here. Anger,
and specifically anger-out, was chosen as a test case for the idea that
all emotions are organized within the conceptual self-system by comple-
mentary degrees of dissociation/integration. The relation between dis-
sociation and anger-in does not contradict Bower's associative network
model, either. It would seem that among the routines evoked by anger
arousal are those related to anger at onesel f.
It should be noted in this context that three subjects each repor-
ted one episode of anger-in with no accompanying anger at another. One
other subject (Joe) reported five such episodes. This is a total of
eight episodes of pure-anger-i n out of a total of 195 episodes for all
subjects. There were, of course, many more episodes in which anger-in
was an accompaniment to anger-out.
The finding that dissociation and anger-in are directly related
is welcome, then, because it corrects a too narrow application of the
theoretical considerations and it opens the way for considering disso-
ciation in the context of other emotions.
The results for anxiety are more puzzling than this. Hypothesis
Three is confirmed using the pooled data for all subjects, ie. there
is a direct relation between dissociation and intensity of anxiety.
When the same hypothesis is tested with the date from High Dissocia-
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tion subjects, this relation becomes non-significant. At first these
data seem extremely troubling for the general theory of dissociation
since anxiety plays such a key role in the development and maintenance
of dissociative structural relations among self-theory elements.
The hypothesized linear relation between dissociation and anxiety
remains for the Low Dissociation subjects. In fact, it is enhanced by
removing the data of the High-Dissociation subjects. The curve which
describes the data for the High Dissociation is "J-shaped . " That is,
very high dissociation scores are paired with very high anxiety scores,
low dissociation scores are paired with middle-range anxiety scores,
and middle-range dissociation scores are paired with very low anxiety
scores
.
There is no simple way to explain these results. What seems best
is to attribute them to idiosyncratic departures from the general case.
These individual differences can be understood as due to the several
ways, separately or in combination, by which anxiety can be aroused and
can create conditions for dissociation in the self-theory. Perhaps
precisely because dissociation is an anxiety phenomenon, subjective
reports of anxiety levels at high levels of dissociation are unreliable
because anxiety is avoided preconsciously
. Perhaps better instrumenta-
tion is needed to assess anxiety at high levels of dissociation than
was attempted here.
It was originally expected that the presence of visual imagery,
specifically imagery of attack, would be indicative of dissociative
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anger. Hypothesis Four is not confirmed and, overall, no other inter-
pretable significant relations between visual imagery and dissociation
exist. It seems now that this idea was wrongly conceived, for visual
percepts should function as links between other cognitive structure.
The therapeutic use of visual imagery in hypnosis and free association
shows that visual images can be used as entree to previously non-con-
scious cognitions (Singer & Pope, 1978). Visual percepts, associative
links which become conscious to the person as imagery during an anger
episode, serve an integrative function. This is, of course, the oppo-
site of what was originally predicted. As the present data were con-
ceived, however, there can be no confirmation of the presence of disso-
ciation by the absence of significant statistical relations for visual
imagery and dissociation. The relation of visual imagery to anger and
other emotions is important and could be explored in future research.
Whether visual imagery that spontaneously occurs contributes more to
feelings of control or feelings of lack of control is still an open
question
.
One final difficulty should be briefly discussed. This is the
problem of subjects' compliance and drop-out rates. Much of Epstein's
previous research used undergraduate psychology students participating
in the context of a semester-long course . In this content, completion
of the research protocols is a requirement for course completion. The
present study did not have this advantage. The results are much jnore
dependent on the willingness of the subjects to contribute to the pro-
ject and to the investigator personally. The strength of the motiva-
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tion required for completion of fifteen episode records is indicated
by the fact that less than half of the writer's friends who were re-
cruited completed the required number of protocols.
It seems clear that subjects must be capable of detailed reflec-
tion on their own emotional experiences. They must be willing to
share these reflections with a stranger. Their lives must be organ-
ized in a way which allows frequent periodic reflection and recording
of their experiences, at least for a few weeks. It might be suggested
that these are not the qualities of people who have difficulty control-
ling their anger, or of people who experience dissociative phenomena.
Nevertheless, the data show that even these "well socialized" persons
experience barely controlled anger and dissociation. If anything, this
biased sample supports the theoretical argument better than a more
"deviant" sample would since the aim was to demonstrate the existence
of normal or complementary dissociation.
Nine of the thirteen subjects wrote a brief paper on their experi-
ences doing the research after they had completed all requirements.
(Four subjects did not comply with this request.) All of these sub-
jects thought that the study required a lot of them, and all reported
that the personal rewards made the study worth their effort. Among
these nine subjects there is an unanimous claim of personal benefit.
The following are representative excerpts from their written statements.
I also started to think more when I started to get
angry, in that before the anger got out of hand, I was
thinking more about what was going on and what could be
done; whereas before the experiment, by the time I started
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to think what was going on or what could be done the episode
was more or less over with. (Subject #3)
I guess that I learned how my anger isn't a simple
thing, but also how I don't really let it be easy. All
the appraising that I do in anger situations tends 'to' boq
me down from acting the way I would like to. (Subiect #1
Peter) '
By just participating in the experiment, I became more
aware of things that got me angry. Recording the episodes
became somewhat therapeutic. Not only did I begin to rea-
lize the actual object of my anger, but I also came to re-
alize that little things got me angry. Previously, I be-
lieved that I barely got mad except for extreme cases
(Subject #10, Marcia)
There are probably a variety of reasons for dropping out or com-
pleting this study as a subject. One reason for completing it is the
expectation, need for, or actual experience or personal change. One
way to view this phenomenon is as a contaminant of the "pure" theore-
tical and methodological issues involved. But a more interesting and
fruitful view is that actual self change, at least for the duration of
the study, took place. These changes might be revealed in the present
data by examining reliability coefficients for selected relationships
between variables over different prediction intervals. For example,
hypotheses could be derived from the self reports of change and select-
ed variables which might reflect those changes could be examined by a
split-half reliability method. It could be predicted that change would
be shown by differences in correlation coefficients between a subject's
first episodes and his or her last episodes.
These reports of self change are unexpected and welcome. This
paper was formulated theoretically as a contribution to Epstein's
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theory of the integrative cognitive self-theory. Methodologically
it is an extension of Epstein's methods into a little investigated
subject. But there were also other motivations. Cognitive self-
theory has implications for any general psychological theory of psy-
chopathology. Points of contact between a theory of psychopathology
and cognitive self-theory have been mentioned previously in this
paper. Aspects of psychopathy which may be psychologically explained
by a fully developed cognitive self-theory include acute schizophrenic
disorganization, post-traumatic stress disorders, multiple personality,
and impulse disorders such as child abuse and other violent offenses.
The structural relation of the emotions within the oeverall, in-
tegrative self-theory has implications for therapy. The complementary
functions of dissociation and integration in the self-theory means
that emotional experience plays an organizing role as well as an atten-
tion-focusing role and an activating role for the self. The implica-
tion is that self change in therapy may depend not only on insight
and cdgnitive change but also on the experience of emotions in the im-
mediate encounter between therapist and client which the therapist can
aid the client in later integrating.
Future research
. Future research guided by this study and discussion
can focus on any of three related areas: 1). the investigation of
dissociative phenomena in intense emotional experiences other than
anger; 2). the comparative study of normal or complementary dissocia-
tion with dysfunctional dissociation in the self-theory; 3). the study
no
of the organizing function of emotional experience in self change.
Research for which a psychologically "normal" sample suffices
should be done in a context which maximizes a subject's motivation
to participate and to complete the study. Thus, it seems prudent
to carry out future research of this type in the psychology course
context already developed by Epstein.
In research with any clinical population, the method will
have to be changed. It is questionable whether a clinical popula-
tion of the kind already mentioned would produce these data on their
own. An interview format would likely be more effective. The prob-
lems this raises are many, but probably manageable. The retrospec-
tive reconstruction of an emotional episode in a subsequent interview
is subject to many possible distortions. In addition, the current
methods call for sampling over many occasions which entails the devel-
opment of a relationship between investigator and subject if inter-
views are used. The therapeutic relationship is not always the best
format for research, so conflicts of interest could easily arise.
Nevertheless, assuming these difficulties could be managed adequately,
a semi-structured clinical interview could be developed which focused
on the features of emotional experiences of interest. These inter-
views could be recorded and later coded into data values for statisti-
cal analyses.
Summary . The self-concept is more correctly understood as a self-
theory, a hierarchically organized and internally consistent set of
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cognitions and postulates, which the person holds about him or her-
self. The postulates and cognitions of the self-theory can be explicit
or implicit. The functions of the self-theory are to organize the data
of experience while maintaining its own organization, to maintain a
favorable pleasure/pain balance for the person, and to maintain self-
esteem. Emotion is a central experience whenever something self-sig-
nificant occurs to the person. Emotional reaction is initiated and
guided by cognitive structure.
The unity of the self-theory is always balanced against the other
functions. Thus, certain data of experience are dissociated in order
to avoid disruption of the self-theory's organization which would in
turn affect its functioning. Dissociation occurs naturally in the
structural relation of the emotions to each other and to the hierar-
chically superior self-theory. The emotions serve an orienting func-
tion. In this last function, the temporary dissociation of uninte-
gratable experience occurs by reacting emotionally. Later, these
data may be available for the work of integration by re-experiencing
the emotion. This point is compatible with research results on mood
and memory. Information learned in a certain state or mood is more
readily available for recall in that same state or mood.
Clinical material on the treatment of child abusers and of out-
patient violent offenders suggests that strong anger is at times a
dissociative phenomenon. A scale of dissociative experience was
constructed on the basis of the phenomenological reports of dissocia-
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tion in this literature. Dissociation includes feelings of impend-
ing disaster, of passing a point of no return, of being detached and
observing oneself, of acting automatically, of unreality, and of deper-
sonal ization.
Thirteen subjects completed a study of their own anger experiences..
Each subject recorded data on fifteen anger episodes. These data were
used to test several hypotheses about dissociative anger. With data
pooled over all subjects, dissociative experiences were shown to be
directly related to anger at another. With the effects of anger-out
partialed out, dissociative experiences were shown to be directly re-
lated to anger at self, to anxiety, to awareness of a variety of physi-
cal changes, to impulses to attack someone, and to the intensity of
the emotion which immediately replaces anger. The data were also
examined among High Dissociation subjects alone (N = 6) and it was
found that actual verbal or physical attack is also related to inten-
sity of dissociative experiences. Six out of seven hypotheses were con-
firmed
.
Individual cases were examined quantitatively and qualitatively.
The quantitative analyses revealed a variety of idiosyncratic depart-
ures from the overall group trends. The qualitative analyses showed
that each subject's episodes clustered under individually charac-
teristic headings which were interpreted as involving more or less
integrated "part-selves" or social identities. The average dissocia-
tion intensity of each cluster is seen as an index of the degree of
113
non-integration of the "part-self."
Subjects reported that the experience of the study changed them.
Especially affected was the way they viewed their own anger. This
group of subjects were people who did not complain of their anger
nor of their dissociative experiences. Future research should in-
vestigate more extreme forms of dissociative anger with an identified
clinical population. Also of interest is to expand the study of emo-
tional experiences in which dissociation plays a role. These might
include fear, sadness or depression, joy, and sexual desire. Finally,
empirical verification of the organizing function of emotion is
needed
.
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AFD PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE
SCREENING DATA
Subjects completed the AFD Personality Questionnaire before
participating in the study. This instrument consists in 94 state-
ments which can be endorsed as being true of oneself on a five-
point scale. Several factors, consisting in 10 statements each,
have been identified on this scale. The data reported here are
the individual scores as well as summary descriptive data for the
three Hostility factors from the scale:
Factor I, Confl ict over hosti 1 i ty
Factor II, Proneness to Anger and Aggression
Factor III, Hostility Avoidance
For each factor, the higher the value, the more of the quality
described can be attributed to the person or sub-group. (Some data
are missing for subjects #11 and #12.)
AFD Personality Questionnaire
Screening Data
Factors
Subject I II III X DISSO
#2 (High DISSO, Joe) 38 37 30 9.00
#4 (High DISSO, Glen) 31 25 32 5.00
#1 (High DISSO, Peter) 33 20 26 4.07
#6 (High DISSO) 18 38 33 1 .67
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#10 (Low DISSO, Marcia) 16 14 37 1 .40
#12 (Low DISSO, Steven) 35 md md 1 .00
#8 (Low DISSO, DAVE) 17 12 31 .33
#9 (Low DISSO) 27 27 32 1 .40
#7 (Low DISSO) 16 30 28 1 .47
#5 (Low DISSO) 33 27 34 1 .47
#3 (Low DISSO) 32 30 30 1 .47
Summary X 25 .14 23 .33 32.00 1 .22
sd 8 .59 8 .14 3.16 .43
N 7 6 6 7
Total Summary X 26 .23 25 .55 31 .36 2.47
sd 7 .95 8 .36 2.94 2.33
N 13 11 11 13

